



**Transparency
International
Zambia**



**2019
Zambia Bribe Payers Index
Survey Report
(ZBPI)**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Zambia Bribe Payers Index (ZBPI) is a corruption measurement tool based on a countrywide household survey. The tool measures the probability of public service seekers experiencing a bribe seeking behaviour from a public officer in a public sector institution.

In 2019, the ZBPI also provides insights into bribery experiences on specific public services sought in Zambia Police Service, Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), Local Authorities (Councils), Ministry of General Education (MoGE), and Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE).

It is important to note that the 2019 ZBPI introduces new methodological terms so as to provide more information that helps identify specific areas of concern. These are *Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)* which is a bribery experience where a bribe was asked for when seeking a public service; *institution-based bribery experience* which is an individual's bribery experience with an institution or sector; *service-based bribery experience* that is, an individual's bribery experience specific to a public service that was sought within an institution; and *Service Seeking Interaction (SSI)*, an individual's visit to or interaction with a public or private sector institution when seeking a public service that the institution provides.

The 2019 ZBPI also provides observations on the public's perceptions of good governance indicators that are critical to anti-corruption; governance factors that are perceived to promote corruption; public participation; and, the dichotomy of bribery incidences.

The findings of the 2019 ZBPI Survey shows that the probability of paying a bribe sought or inducement of any kind to a public officer(s) when seeking a public service is 10.9%. The likelihood of an individual paying a bribe sought increased by 0.9% in 2019, when compared to 2017.

The ZBPI trends based on comparative sixteen (16) public sector institutions shows a moderate consistent increase in the probability of paying a bribe in the reporting years 2009 (13.6), 2012 (9.8), 2014 (11.9), 2017 (13.5) and 2019 (15.0).

Comparison of the Zambia Briber Payers Index (ZBPI) to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) over each Index's respective reporting years also shows minimal differences in the trajectory of the country's corruption problem, as both indices show a consistent increase in the problem of corruption.

At an institution level, no probabilities of paying a bribe sought are observed in Ministry of Works and Supply, National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA), Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF) and Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL). Lower probabilities are evidenced in Immigration Department (0.6%), Ministry of Finance (0.2%), and Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA) (0.2%). Higher probabilities are observed in Zambia Police Service, excluding Traffic section (59.5%) and Traffic section (40.7%), Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) (38.7%), Local Authorities, (22.9%), and Ministries for Education, (21.1) %.

Compared to 2017 ZBPI, considerable decreases in the likelihood of an individual seeking a public service paying a bribe sought are observed in Zambia Police Service (Traffic section) (23.2%), Local Authorities (Councils) (14.1%) and, Ministries for Education (6.4%). Increases are observed in Zambia Police Service (excluding Traffic) (40.5%), and Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) (18.9%).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, in an individual's Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) with the public sector, bribe seeking was experienced in 73.9% of the 23 institutions, and that 28.6% individuals had a Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI).

The Report shows that, for instance, in Zambia Police Service, Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) as a percent of Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) is observed to be highest in other services (employment or recruitment into the Service) and traffic related services, and lowest in criminal investigations and Victim Support Services. Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) bribe seeking is most experienced in other services and licensing of public service vehicles, and lower in licensing of driving schools. Local Authorities (Councils), Bribe Seeking Incidents (BSI) are more prevalent in firearm licensing and property rates services, and less in trading licensing and business permits.

The reasons for paying a bribe in service-based bribery experiences are predominantly to avoid delays in getting a service. And that, with respect to actual service sought, in Zambia Police Service bribes are paid more to avoid penalties or sanctions in traffic related services. In Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), Local Authorities (Councils), Ministry of General Education (MoGE) and Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), paying a bribe to avoid delays is most common.

Thereof, the 2019 ZBPI Survey Report evidences that since the trajectory of the probability of public service seekers experiencing bribe seeking is consistently showing no significant improvement in general, there is need for development of service-specific anti-corruption interventions and scaling up "*voicing out*" and reporting.

For instance, the Report observes that contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption is very low (8.5% of 1,897 respondents), and that contact is mostly with individuals that are formally employed in the public and private sectors.

Anti-corruption participation and leadership with respect to "*voicing out*" on corruption and, reporting when a demand for a bribe is made are also very low, 8.3% and 4.2% respectively.

Lastly, the Report observes that the dominant "two faces" or dichotomy of bribery incidences are, first, that knowledge of what constitutes corruption can likely be associated with one's bribe offering behaviours, as only 12.1% of those that know what constitutes corruption offered a bribe, and only 6.5% of individuals that had contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption offered a bribe. Second, that "*voicing out*" on corruption is not seemingly associated with bribe paying when a demand is made. Twenty-five point one (25.1) percent of individuals that "*voiced out*" on corruption are shown to have paid the bribe that was asked for by a public officer; and, a considerable number that report bribery incidences also do actually pay the bribe demanded.

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ACRONYMS

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
BPI	Bribe Payers Index
BSI	Bribe Seeking Incident
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
DEC	Drug Enforcement Commission
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GCB	Global Corruption Barometer
JCC	Judicial Complaints Commission
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoGE	Ministry of General Education
MoFL	Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoHE	Ministry of Higher Education
MoL	Ministry of Lands
MWS	Ministry of Works and Supply
NAPSA	National Pension Scheme Authority
NRO	National Registration Office
OAG	Office of the Auditor General
OPPZ	Office of the Public Protector Zambia
PACRA	Patents and Companies Registration Agency
PPCC	Police Public Complaints Commission
PPS	Proportionate to Population Size
PSMD	Public Service Management Division
PSPF	Public Service Pensions Fund
PSU	Primary Sampling Units
PSV	Public Service Vehicle
RDA	Road Development Agency
RTSA	Road Transport and Safety Agency
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SSI	Service Seeking Interaction
TI-Z	Transparency International Zambia
ZBPI	Zambia Bribe Payers Index
ZESCO	Zambia Electricity Supply Company
ZP	Zambia Police Service
ZRA	Zambia Revenue Authority
ZAMTEL	Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited

DEFINITION OF TERMS

“Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)” means a bribery experience where a bribe was asked for when seeking a public service.

“Bribery” means the act of promising, giving, accepting or soliciting money or other benefits, as an inducement for an action which is illegal, unethical or a breach of trust.

“Corruption” means soliciting, accepting, obtaining, giving, promising or offering of gratification by way of a bribe or other personal temptation or inducement or the misuse or abuse of a public office or authority for private advantage or benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, rushed trials, and electoral malpractices.

“Institution-based bribery experience” means an individual’s bribery experience with an institution or sector.

“Service-based bribery experience” means an individual’s bribery experience specific to a public service that was sought within an institution.

“Service Seeking Interaction (SSI)” means an individual’s visit to or interaction with a public or private sector institution when seeking a public service that the institution provides. This is a frequency or how often a service was sought, and not the number of respondents that sought a service or visited an institution.

“Voicing out” on corruption means reacting against corruption by raising the issue within one’s locality or other at a political or public service level.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Zambia Bribe Payers Index

The Zambia Bribe Payers Index (ZBPI) is a corruption measurement tool which measures the probability of public service seekers experiencing a bribe seeking behaviour from a public officer with respect to a bribe being asked for; a bribe being paid and how often; the amount of the bribe paid; and, implications and consequences or severity of refusing to pay a bribe. The tool also provides the public's perceptual and experiential observations on stakeholder anti-corruption actions, and corruption trends in the country.

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and Transparency International Zambia (TI-Z)¹ jointly conduct the Zambia Bribe Payers Index (ZBPI) survey.

The importance of the ZBPI is that it provides an empirical evidence-base that helps determine priority areas for anti-corruption interventions as it identifies services and sectors where bribery is most experienced.

Thus, the purpose of the Index is to provide data and information that can help the selected target institutions, Transparency International Zambia (TI-Z), the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), and other partners to develop key strategies and approaches that can be adopted in order to reduce incidences of bribery in the public and private sector, and to advocate for participation, transparency and accountability.

1.2 What is New in the 2019 ZBPI

Based on the need to provide more information to help identify specific areas of concern, the 2019 ZBPI not only provides findings on institutions where the likelihood of bribery incidences are comparably high, but also the exact public services within selected target institutions where bribery is experienced.

In short, the 2019 ZBPI Survey Report provides institution-based and service-based insights into bribery incidence.

Institution-based insights are simply an individual's bribery experience with the Survey target institutions as has been done in previous reporting years. Service-based insights, on the other hand, are premised on Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) which is specific to services sought where bribe seeking behaviour is experienced. Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) refers to an individual's visit to or interaction with a public or private sector institution when seeking a public service that the institution provides. SSI is a frequency or how often a service was sought, and not the number of respondents that sought a service or visited an institution.

This 2019 ZBPI Survey Report also provides findings on the public's perceptions of good governance indicators that are critical to anti-corruption and their application levels in Zambia; the governance factors that are perceived to promote corruption in the country; public participation with respect to "*voicing out*" on corruption; and, the dichotomy of bribery incidences, that is respondent bribery behaviours and, anti-corruption knowledge and engagement.

¹ Appendix I provides the briefs on TI-Z and ACC.

2.0 THE SURVEY APPROACH AND ANALYSIS

2.1 Sampling Approach

The Zambia Bribe Payers Index (ZBPI) Survey is based on countrywide household survey of a sample size of 2000 respondents, from all the provincial capitals and one other district in each respective province, which is a total of 20 sample districts.

The 2010 Census data for Zambia is used to determine the sampling frame, and to derive the primary sampling units (PSU), which is the ward.

Stratified Proportionate to Population Size (PPS) sampling is used to get the district sample size; and, then the sample size of the respective ward (PSU) in each district. PPS sampling rather than Simple Random Sampling, is used because PPS surveys in large geographic areas tend to be more efficient. The sample size of each stratum is proportionate to the population size of the stratum relative to the entire population. This means that each stratum has the same sampling fraction, as shown in the formula below.

District Sample Size

$$\text{Sample size} = \frac{\text{No. of Households}}{\text{Total Number of Households in Target Districts}} * 2000$$

PSU (Ward) Sample Size

$$\text{Sample size} = \frac{\text{No. of Households}}{\text{Total Number of Households in Target PSU}} * \text{District Sample Size}$$

Thresholds within each respective ward (PSU), were computed to ensure a sample size that is, at a minimum, not less than three (3) respondents. Sampling intervals were then derived in each PSU.

Appendix II shows the district sample sizes.

2.2 Data collection

The Survey data was collected through use of Open Data Kit (ODK) Collect with predominantly closed ended questions, and open ended ones where appropriate, which included collection of respondent demographic characteristics.

ODK Collect is an open source Android application that allows data collection using mobile devices and data submission to an online server, even without an Internet connection or mobile carrier service at the time of data collection. The data collected can then be sent when one has access to an Internet connection. The questions that constituted the ODK Collect are provided in Appendix III.

Data on respondents' Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) with the public and private sector institutions; and, experiences of bribe seeking behaviours in terms of whether a bribe was asked for when seeking a service (*incidence*), a bribe was paid (*prevalence*) and how often (*frequency*), the amount of the bribe paid (*bribe size*), and a bribe was offered was collected with respect to twenty-three (23) public sector institutions listed in Appendix IV.

Data on respective public services (and, other services specified) a respondent sought in some selected target institutions was also collected. The selected institutions where disaggregated data on services provided was collected are Zambia Police Service, Road Transport and Safety Agency

(RTSA), Local Authorities (Councils), Ministry of General Education (MoGE), and Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE).

Private sector data collection was on experiences with banking; construction; manufacturing; Micro Financial Services; mining; private education ; retail (excluding banking or micro financial services); and other services specified by a respondent.

2.3 Survey Data Analysis

Data analysis constituted solely quantitative approaches. Excel functions using multiple functions of up to three and four conditions being true, is used to examine or determine relationships within the data that might not be readily apparent when analysing the Survey responses².

Multiple criteria functions are also used as a means of detecting subtleties in bribery experiences and, have indications of social groupings most affected or most vulnerable.

Premised on multiple criteria functions, Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) and paying a bribe that is asked for (*prevalence*), are analysed within a comparative framework of respondent Service Seeking Interaction (SSI).

2.4 Calculating the Aggregate Bribery Index

The Aggregate Bribery Index provides an indication of the probability or likelihood of a bribe demand being paid. The Index is calculated using the weighted average of three key performance indicators (KPIs). These are *Incidence* (number of times officials asked for bribes); *Prevalence* (number of people that paid bribes); and, *Frequency* (number of times individuals paid bribes) in twenty-two (22) public sector institutions.

The KPI weighted average score for each individual target public institution is first calculated, using the formula:

$$\text{KPI Weighted Average Score} = \left[\left(I \frac{\text{Institution Aggregate}}{\sum(\text{No. of Responses})} \right) + \left(P \frac{\text{Institution Aggregate}}{\sum(\text{No. of Responses})} \right) + \left(F \frac{\text{Institution Aggregate}}{\sum(\text{No. of Responses})} \right) \right] * 100$$

Denotations: *I* = Incidence; *P* = Prevalence; and, *F* = Frequency.

\sum denotes SUM (addition of a group of numbers)

Note that, multiplication by 100 is used to reduce the KPI weighted average score to a percent. For an individual institution, this also provides what is termed as the Aggregate Index.

Then the Overall Aggregate Bribery Index is calculated using the formula:

$$\text{Overall Aggregate Bribery Index} = \frac{\sum(\text{Weighted Average Score})}{\text{No. of Institutions}}$$

² An example of multiple criteria functions used is =COUNTIFS('Integrity Checked'!D2:D2001,"=Female",'Integrity Checked'!R2:R2001,"Paid bribe sought",'Integrity Checked'!Y2:Y2001,"=It is a normal trend",'Integrity Checked'!X2:X2001,"=Felt compelled to pay to get a service")

Interpreting the Index

At an institutional level an Aggregate Index (KPI Weighted Average Score) of, for example 25.1%, means that an individual has a 25.1% chance or probability of paying a bribe or inducement of any kind that is sought by a public officer(s) in the respective institution that the individual sought a public service from.

At the country level, an Overall Aggregate Bribery Index of, for example 10.0%, means that a public service seeker has a 10.0% chance of paying a bribe sought in any of the public sector institutions covered in the Survey.

2.5 Overview of Respondent Demographics

The 2019 ZBPI Survey comprised 48.2% female and 51.8% male respondents; and, 4.4% persons with disabilities. The age cohort was, 31.6% of the respondents are between 26 and 35 years old; 28.2%, 36 to 45; 15.9%, 46 to 55, as shown in Figure 1.0 below.




Figure 1.0 Respondents' Age Cohort

The distribution of the respondents' marital status is 20.7% single; 68.0% married; 2.4% separated; 3.2% divorced; and 5.7% widowed. And, that of area of residence is 34.1% high density; 14.2% low; 35.9% medium; and, 15.8% reside in a village.

The respondents' highest level of education attained is mostly Secondary School (54.6%) and Tertiary (33.9%), Primary (9.8%), and not been to school (1.8%).

While, respondent's occupation or current employment status characteristics are self-employed (business owner) 19.9%; formally employed (private sector) 15.9%; other self-employed (trader, marketeer, fisherman or woman) 14.9%; formally employed (public sector) 13.8%; farmer 13.8%; unemployed 12.9%; retired 4.8%; and, transporter 4.0% (Figure 2.0).




Figure 2.0 Respondents' Employment Status

Lastly, the respondent's average monthly disposable income (income after taxes) characteristics are less or equal to Kwacha 1,000, 47.0%; Kwacha 1,000 to 2,500, 24.3%; Kwacha 2,501 to 5,000, 19.0%; Kwacha 5,000 to 7,500, 6.9%; and, over Kwacha 7,500, 2.8%, as shown in Figure 3.0 below.




Figure 3.0 Respondents' Average Monthly Disposable Income

3.0 THE 2019 ZBPI SURVEY FINDINGS

The findings of the 2019 Zambia Bribe Payers Index (ZBPI) Survey are presented as Part A, the 2019 Overall Aggregate Bribery Index; Part B, institution-based bribery experiences in the public and private sectors; Part C, service-based bribery experiences in selected institutions; Part D, governance, participation and leadership in the context of anti-corruption; and Part E, the dichotomy of bribery.

Part A provides the 2019 Overall Aggregate Bribery Index established for the country, with respect to the individual ZBPI target public sector institutions. Comparisons are also made with preceding reporting years.

Part B provides the findings of the Survey on institution-based personal interactions with a public and private sector institution in the last 12 months; and, the respondents' bribery experiences of bribe seeking behaviours in terms of whether a bribe was asked for when seeking a service (*incidence*), a bribe was paid (*prevalence*) and how often (*frequency*), and the amount of the bribe paid (*bribe size*).

Part B also provides the findings on the implications and consequences or *severity* of refusing to pay a bribe demanded by a public officer or an individual in the private sector; and, whether those that paid a bribe felt compelled to do so, and the reason a bribe was paid.

Part C provides the findings on service-based bribery experiences in selected institutions, which are the top five target public sector institutions on the Aggregate Bribery Index where bribery experiences are disaggregated by the public services provided.

These selected institutions are Zambia Police Service; Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA); Local Authorities (Councils); Ministry of General Education; and, Ministry of Higher Education.

Part D provides the findings on respondents' perceptions of good governance indicators that are critical to anti-corruption and their application levels in Zambia; governance factors that are perceived to promote corruption in the country; corruption knowledge and anti-corruption engagement; public participation with respect to "*voicing out*" on corruption and reporting bribery incidences; and, leadership in anti-corruption.

Lastly, Part E discusses the dichotomy of bribery incidences, that is respondent bribery behaviours and, anti-corruption knowledge and engagement.

PART A. THE 2019 AGGREGATE BRIBERY INDEX³

3.1 The 2019 Aggregate Bribery Index

Based on twenty-two (22) public sector institutions, the 2019 Overall Aggregate Bribery Index established for the country is 10.9%. This means that an individual has a 10.9% likelihood of paying a bribe sought when seeking a service from a public institution, as shown in Table 1.0 below.

With respect to the individual ZBPI target public sector institutions, Table 1.0 shows that higher chances of an individual paying a bribe sought are to the Zambia Police Service (excluding Traffic section), 59.5%; Zambia Police Service (Traffic section), 40.7%; Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), 38.7%; Local Authorities (Councils), 22.9%; and Ministries for Education (General and Higher), 21.1%⁴.

Lower probabilities of paying a bribe are observed in Immigration Department, 0.6%; Ministry of Finance, 0.2%; Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA), 0.2%; and, no chances of paying a bribe being observed in Ministry of Works and Supply, National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA), Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF) and Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL).

³ The associated KPI calculations Confidence Levels are Incidence, 4.22; Prevalence and Frequency 3.59.

⁴ For comparatives analysis purposes the Ministries of General Education and Ministry of Higher Education KPI weighted average scores are combined to represent one entity. This is also done for the Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock.

Table 1.0 2019 Aggregate Bribery Index

No	Name of Institution	KPI Weighted Average Score
1	Zambia Police Service - excludes Traffic section	59.5
2	Zambia Police Service - Traffic	40.7
3	Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA)	38.7
4	Local Authorities (Councils)	22.9
5	Ministries for Education (General & Higher)	22.1
6	Zambia Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO)	9.8
7	Health Services	9.2
8	National Registration Office	7.9
9	Judiciary (courts)	6.5
10	Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) - Customs	4.0
11	Ministry of Lands (Land issues only)	5.9
12	Passport Office	4.8
13	Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) - Tax	4.3
14	Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock	0.8
15	Road Development Agency (RDA)	0.8
16	Immigration Department	0.6
17	Ministry of Finance	0.2
18	Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA)	0.2
19	Ministry of Works and Supply	0.0
20	National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA)	0.0
21	Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF)	0.0
22	Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL)	0.0
Overall Aggregate Bribery Index		10.9

3.2 Aggregate Bribery Index 2017 and 2019

The 2019 ZBPI Overall Aggregate Bribery Index when compared to that in 2017, premised on the comparable twenty-two (22) public sector institutions, shows an increase of 0.9% in the likelihood of a public service seeker paying a bribe to any of the public sector institutions covered in the Survey (Table 2.0).

Table 2.0 Aggregate Bribery Index 2017 and 2019

No	Name of Institution	KPIs Weighted Average Score		Percentage Point Difference
		2017	2019	
1	Zambia Police Service - Other (Excludes Traffic Section)	19.0	59.5	40.5
2	Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA)	19.8	38.7	18.9
3	Zambia Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO)	2.5	9.8	7.3
4	Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) - Customs	2.5	4.0	1.5
5	National Registration Office	4.7	7.9	3.2
6	Ministry of Works and Supply	1.2	0.0	-1.2
7	Passport Office	3.6	4.8	1.2
8	Ministry of Lands (Land issues only)	4.7	5.9	1.2
9	Road Development Agency (RDA)	0.4	0.8	0.4
10	Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA)	0.0	0.2	0.2
11	Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL)	0.0	0.0	0.0
12	National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA)	0.4	0.0	-0.4
13	Ministry of Finance	0.7	0.2	-0.5
14	Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) - Tax	3.1	4.3	1.2
15	Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF)	0.8	0.0	-0.8
16	Immigration Department	2.0	0.6	-1.4
17	Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock	2.7	0.8	-1.9
18	Judiciary (Courts)	9.5	6.5	-3.0
19	Health Services	12.3	9.2	-3.1
20	Ministries for Education (General & Higher)	28.5	22.1	-6.4
21	Local Authorities (Councils)	37.0	22.9	-14.1
22	Zambia Police Service - Traffic	63.9	40.7	-23.2
Overall Aggregate Bribery Index		10.0	10.9	0.9

Further, Table 2.0 shows that the probability of paying a bribe when seeking a public service increased significantly in some institutions, and lessened in others. Considerable increases are observed in Zambia Police Service (excluding Traffic section), 40.5%; and, Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), 18.9%.

And, significant decreases are observed in Zambia Police Service (Traffic section), 23.2%; Local Authorities (Councils), 14.1%; and Ministries for Education, 6.4%.

3.3 Bribe Payers Index Trends

The Zambia Bribe Payers Index trends of the reporting years 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017 and 2019 based on comparative sixteen (16) public sector institutions shows a moderate consistent increase in the probability of paying a bribe when seeking a public service, as shown in Table 3.0 below.

Table 3.0 shows that the chance of an individual paying a bribe when seeking a public service in 2009 was 13.6. This decreased by 3.8 percentage points to 9.8% in 2012, In 2014, the Index increased by 2.1 to 11.9% in 2014, 1.6 to 13.5% in 2017, and 1.5 to 15.0 in 2019.

Table 3.0 Bribe Payers Index Trends

No	Name of Institution	KPIs Weighted Average Score				
		2009	2012	2014	2017	2019
1	Health Services (MoH)	14.0	12.4	9.0	12.3	9.3
2	Immigration Department	7.0	4.7	4.9	2.0	0.6
3	Judiciary (courts)	11.0	8.3	7.4	9.5	6.6
4	Local Authorities	8.0	7.5	17.5	37.0	23.0
5	Min of Agriculture and Livestock	3.0	2.3	10.1	2.7	0.8
6	Ministries for Education	7.0	6.4	13.0	28.5	22.3
7	Min of Lands	20.0	11.6	6.1	4.7	5.9
8	Min of Works and Supply	2.0	1.5	0.2	0.4	0.0
9	National Registration Office	22.0	12.3	9.1	4.7	8.0
10	Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA)	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.2
11	Passport Office	14.0	8.0	8.2	3.6	4.8
12	Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA)	15.0	14.4	14.7	19.8	39.0
13	Zambia Police Service (ZP)	66.0	48.3	78.3	82.9	89.7
14	Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA)	12.0	8.9	7.9	5.6	8.3
15	Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL)	2.0	1.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
16	Zambia Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO)	15.0	8.4	3.9	2.5	9.9
	Overall Aggregate Bribery Index	13.6	9.8	11.9	13.5	15.0
	Difference from Preceding Reporting Year		-3.8	2.1	1.6	1.5

Further, Table 3.0 shows consistent decreases in the likelihood of paying a bribe to Immigration Department 7.0 in 2009, 4.7 in 2012, 4.9 in 2014, 2.0 in 2017 and 0.6 in 2019; and, Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA) with 0.3 in 2009, 0.5 in 2012, 0.5 in 2014, 0.4 in 2017 and 0.2 in 2019.

Consistent increases are observed in Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) with 15.0 in 2009, 14.4 in 2012, 14.7 in 2014, 19.8 in 2017 and 39.0 in 2019; and, Zambia Police Service (ZP) with 66.0 in 2009, 48.3 in 2012, 78.3 in 2014, 82.9 in 2017 and 89.7 in 2019.

PART B. INSTITUTION-BASED BRIBERY EXPERIENCES

3.3 The Public Sector

3.3.1 Public Service Provision Interactions

The 2019 Zambia Bribe Payers Index (ZBPI) Survey shows that, there were a total number of 1,726 (86.3%) respondents that visited or personally interacted with a Survey target public sector institution to seek a service in the last 12 months.

The frequency of institution-based interactions is 62.0% respondents visited a public sector institution, 1 to 3 times; 23.9%, 4 to 7 times; and, 14.1% over seven (7) times. This resulted in a total of 4, 524 institutional interactions or an average of 2.6 interactions per respondent. Of these interactions, 41.9% are by female respondents and 58.1% male.

The most interacted with public sector institutions are Health Services, 21.2%; Zambia Police Service, 13.0%; Local Authorities (Councils), 10.1%; Ministry of General Education (MoGE), 9.0%; and Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), 8.4% (Figure 4.0).




Figure 4.0 Public Service Provision Interactions by Institution

Lastly, public service provision interaction by gender shows that, comparatively less female respondents than male interacted with public sector institutions, 41.9% and 58.1% respectively.

The Survey findings show that female respondents comparatively interacted more with health service institutions (56.0%), Passport Office (54.5%), and Ministry of General Education (51.8%) as shown in Figure 5.0 (a) and (b) below. Figure 5.0 also shows that male respondents interacted most frequently with Ministry of Works and Supply (87.5%), Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) (75.5%), and Ministry of Agriculture (75.0%).




Figure 5.0 (a) Service Provision Interactions in Public Sector Institutions and Gender




Figure 5.0 (b) Service Provision Interactions in Public Sector Institutions and Gender

3.3.2 Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) in Public Sector Institutions

Of the 86.3% (1,726) respondents that sought a service in the Survey target public institution they visited or personally interacted with in the last 12 months, bribe seeking or bribe demand is observed in 73.9% or 17 of the 23 institutions.

No bribe seeking is observed in Food Reserve Agency (FRA); Ministry of Livestock; Ministry of Works and Supply; National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA); Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF); and, Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL).

In 17 institutions where bribe seeking is observed, 494 (28.6%) individuals had a Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI), that is, a public officer(s) asked for a bribe or an inducement of any kind when they visited or personally interacted with a public sector institution.

Bribe Seeking Incidents (BSI) are experienced most in Zambia Police Service (41.7%), Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) (14.2%), Local Authorities (Councils) (10.3%), and Ministry of General Education (MoGE) (8.1%), as shown in Figure 6.0 below.




Figure 6.0 BSI in Public Sector Institutions

With respect to how often a bribe was asked for, 85.0% are observed to have been asked 1 to 3 times; 10.7%, 4 to 7 times; and, 4.3% over 7 times, as shown in Table 4.0 below.

Table 4.0 Frequency of BSI in Public Sector Institutions

Frequency	Bribe sought	
	No. of Respondents	Percent
1 - 3 times	420	85.0%
4 - 7 times	53	10.7%
Over 7 times	21	4.3%
Grand Total	494	100.0%

3.3.3 Bribe Pay and Size in Public Sector Institutions

Bribery incidence in terms of *prevalence* or the number of individuals that paid a bribe that were asked for by a public officer(s) during a visit or interaction with a public sector institution, is observed to be 68.2%, that is 337 respondents of the 494 institution-based bribe seeking experiences.

The number of times in the past 12 months a respondent paid a bribe in any form to a public officer(s) during a visit or interaction is observed to be 1 to 3 times, 88.4%; 4 to 7 times, 7.7%; and, over 7 times 3.9% (Table 5.0).

Table 5.0 Frequency of Bribe Pay in Public Sector Institutions

Bribe Pay	No. of Respondents	Percent
1 - 3 times	298	88.4%
4 - 7 times	26	7.7%
Over 7 times	13	3.9%
Total	337	100.0%

The public sector institution to which any form of a bribe was paid to a public officer most frequently is Zambia Police Service (42.1%); Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) (17.2%); Local Authorities (Councils) (9.2%); and, Ministry of General Education (MoGE) (6.8%), as shown in Figure 7.0 below.




Figure 7.0 Most Frequent Bribe Pay in Public Sector Institutions

The most frequent bribe amount paid in the past 12 months to a public officer(s) is observed to be Kwacha 101 to 250 (21.4%), and Kwacha 251 to 500 (18.4%) as shown in Figure 8.0 below. Two incidences of payment of a bribe in kind, specifically sexual favours, constituting 0.6% are also observed.




Figure 8.0 Brbe Size in Public Sector Institutions

The Survey findings show that the largest brbe demanded in the past 12 months is over Kwacha 2,000, and of 30 respondents that paid a brbe of over Kwacha 2,000, 33.3% was to an officer(s) in the Zambia Police Service; 16.7% RTSA; 13.3% ZESCO; and 10.0% Ministry of General Education, as shown in Figure 9.0 below.




Figure 9.0 Brbe Size of Over K2,000 in Public Sector Institutions

3.4 The Private Sector

The Zambia Brbe Payers Index (ZBPI) Survey findings on the private sector bribery experiences are with respect to banking; construction; manufacturing; Micro Financial Services; mining; private education; retail (excluding banking and micro financial services); and other services specified by a respondent.

3.4.1 Private Sector Interactions with the Public

There were a total number of 738 (36.9%) respondents that visited or personally interacted with a private sector institution to seek a service in the last 12 months.

Fifty-five point four (55.4) percent visited a public sector institution, 1 to 3 times; 19.4%, 4 to 7 times; and, 25.2% over seven (7) times.

A considerable number of respondents visited or personally interacted with the banking sector, 51.1%, and retail (excluding banking and micro financial services), 23.3% (Figure 10.0). Figure 10.0 also shows that, 8.8% interacted with private education; 6.8% micro financial services; 3.0% mining; 2.6% construction; 2.4% other sectors; and, 2.0% manufacturing.




Figure 10.0 Service Provision Interactions in Private Sector

The other sectors visited or interacted with are hospitality, insurance, health services, and transportation.

Private sector interaction by gender shows that, comparatively more female respondents tended to interact with micro financial services (64.0%) and private education services (63.1%), as shown in Figure 11.0 below. While male respondents comparatively interacted more with the mining sector 95.5% and construction sector 89.5%.




Figure 11.0 Service Provision Interactions in Private Sector and Gender

3.4.2 Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) in the Private Sector

Bribe seeking or bribe demand in the private sector is observed to be 7.9% of the 738 respondents that visited or personally interacted with a private sector institution.

Bribe Seeking Incidents (BSI) in the private sector are experienced most in other sectors (27.6%), mining (24.1%); retail (excluding banking or micro financial services) (12.1%); and, banking (12.1%), as shown in Figure 12.0 below.




Figure 12.0 BSI in the Private Sector

The most prevalent number of times a bribe was asked for in the private sector is 1 to 3 times constituting 79.3%.

3.4.3 Bribe Pay and Size in the Private Sector

Payment of the bribe that was asked for by a member of staff or members of staff during a respondent's service seeking visit or interaction in the private sector is observed to be 51.7% of the 58 bribe seeking experiences. Seventy-six point seven (76.7) percent of the respondents paid the bribe requested 1 to 3 times; 10.0% 4 to 7 times; and, 13.3% over 7 times.

The private sector to which a bribe in any form was paid to a member of staff in the past 12 months most frequently, is observed to be mining (23%) followed by retail, banking and other sectors all at 16.7 % (Figure 13.0).




Figure 13.0 Most Frequent Bribe Pay in the Private Sector

The bribe amount observed to have been paid most in the past 12 months to a member of staff or members of staff in the sector is Kwacha 501 to 1,000 constituting 33.3% of the different bribe amounts paid, with over Kwacha 2,000 being observed in the manufacturing and mining sectors, one and two respondents respectively (Table 6.0).

Table 6.0 Bribe Size in the Private Sector

Amount	No. of Respondents	Percent
Less than K100	6	20.0%
K101 - K250	4	13.3%
K501 - K1,000	10	33.3%
K1,001 - K2,000	7	23.3%
Over K2,000	3	10.0%
Grand Total	30	100.0%

3.5 Severity and Bribe Pay Factors

This sub-section provides the findings of the Survey on the implications and consequences of refusing to pay a bribe demanded by a public officer or an individual in the private sector; and, whether those that paid a bribe felt compelled to do so, and the reason a bribe was paid.

The Survey findings show that a total of 185 (33.5%) respondents did not pay the bribe that was asked for by a public officer(s) or by a member of staff or members of staff in the private sector during their visit or interaction.

The reasons for not paying the bribe are observed to be because the respondent had no money (48.9%); the respondent does not condone bribery (42.6%); and other reasons constituting that one reported to a relevant authority, that the case was straight forward, the service sought was straightforward and did not need an inducement of any kind, and that the bribe amount sought was excessive (8.5%).

Further, the findings show that in 42.4% of the cases were a respondent refused to pay the bribe that was sought, service provision was unnecessarily delayed; 37.0% were denied the service; 11.1% service was given extraordinarily faster; and, 9.5% service was given promptly (Figure 14.0).




Figure 14.0 Consequences of Bribe Pay Refusal

In addition, 52.5% of those that paid the bribe that were demanded by a public officer or an individual in the private sector did not feel compelled to pay in order to get a service, as shown in Table 7.0 below.

Table 7.0 Bribe Pay Compulsion

Compulsion	Paid Bribe Sought	
	No. of Respondents	Percent
Did not feel compelled	177	52.5%
Felt compelled	160	47.5%
Grand Total	337	100.0%

And, of the 47.5% respondents that felt compelled to pay the bribe that was asked for, 39.4% paid the bribe to avoid delays; 21.9% to avoid penalties or sanctions; 15.6% because of fear of service denial; 15.0% because it is a normal trend; 4.4% because of lack of information on how to access the service; and, 3.7% to reduce costs (Figure 15.0).




Figure 15.0 Bribe Pay Compulsion Factors

3.6 Demographic Dimensions of Bribery Experiences

3.6.1 Gender

Gender disaggregation of the number of individuals that paid a bribe that was asked for by a public officer(s) after a Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) is observed to be 64.0% female and 71.1% male respondents (Table 8.0).

Table 8.0 Gender Dimensions of BSI and Bribe Paying

Gender	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	No. of Respondents that Paid a Bribe	Percent Bribe Paid of BSI
Female	203	130	64.0%
Male	291	207	71.1%
Total	494	337	68.2%

Bribe pay factors by gender, shows that comparatively more female respondents than male felt compelled to pay the bribe that was asked for mostly to reduce costs, 66.7% and 33.3% respectively as shown in Figure 16.0 below.

Figure 16.0 also shows that, comparatively more male than female respondents felt compelled to pay the bribe mostly because they sought to avoid penalties or sanctions, 80.0% and 20.0% respectively.




Figure 16.0 Bribe Pay Factors and Gender

3.6.2 Age Cohort

In terms of the respondent's age cohort and paying a bribe asked for during a visit or interaction, respondents between the ages 26 and 35 years old are observed to have paid most when asked for a bribe (70.2%), and the least that paid a bribe when asked for are those over 65 years old (50.0%), as shown in Table 9.0 below.

Table 9.0 Age Cohort Dimensions of BSI and Bribe Paying

Age Cohort	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	No. of Respondents that Paid a Bribe	Percent Bribe Paid of BSI
18-25	72	50	69.4%
26-35	168	118	70.2%
36-45	139	94	67.6%
46-55	80	55	68.8%
56-65	27	16	59.3%
Over 65	8	4	50.0%

3.6.3 Highest Level of Education Attained

Payment of a bribe asked for during a visit or interaction with a public institution, is observed to be most common among those with secondary education (70.3%), and least with those with primary education (52.0%) as shown in Table 10.0 below.

Table 10.0 Education Dimensions of BSI and Bribe Paying

Highest Level of Education Attained	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	No. of Respondents that Paid a Bribe	Percent Bribe Paid of BSI
Not been to school	6	4	66.7%
Primary	25	13	52.0%
Secondary	256	180	70.3%
Tertiary	207	140	67.6%

3.6.4 Occupation or Current Employment Status

Respondent occupation or current employment status and payment of a bribe asked for by a public officer(s) during a visit or interaction with a public institution, is most prevalent among transporters, 84.4%; the formally employed in the public sector, 76.3%; and, other self-employed (trader, marketeer, fisherman or woman), 75.8% (Table 11.0).

Table 11.0 further shows that bribe paying behaviours when a bribe is sought are least experienced among those that are retired (43.8%).

Table 11.0 Employment Status Dimensions of BSI and Bribe Paying

Employment Status	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	No. of Respondents that Paid a Bribe	Percent Bribe Paid of BSI
Formally employed (Public sector)	97	74	76.3%
Formally employed (Private sector)	81	55	67.9%
Self-employed (Business owner)	88	53	60.2%
Other self-employed (trader, marketeer, fisherman or woman)	66	50	75.8%
Farmer	34	22	64.7%
Transporter	32	27	84.4%
Retired	16	7	43.8%
Unemployed	51	33	64.7%

The reasons for frequently paying a bribe sought among formally employed in the public sector, transporters and other self-employed, is observed to be that transporters felt compelled to pay the bribe that was asked for mostly to avoid penalties or sanctions 43.8%; the formally employed in the public sector and other self-employed to avoid delays, 57.9% and 47.6% respectively as shown in Figure 17.0 below.




Figure 17.0 Bribe Pay Factors and Selected Employment Status

3.6.5 Average Monthly Disposable Income

Respondent's average monthly disposable income (income after taxes) and percent of bribe paid of Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) is observed to be most prominent among respondents of an income of Kwacha 5,001 - 7,500 (81.6%), and least prominent among those with an income of over Kwacha 7,500 (57.1%), as shown in Table 12.0 below.

Table 12.0 Income Dimensions of BSI and Bribe Paying

Average Monthly Disposable Income (income after taxes)	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	No. of Respondents that Paid a Bribe	Percent Bribe Paid of BSI
<= K1,000	201	130	64.7%
K1,001 - K2,500	113	83	73.5%
K2,501 - K5,000	118	79	66.9%
K5,001 - K7,500	38	31	81.6%
> K7,500	14	8	57.1%

PART C. SERVICE-BASED BRIBERY EXPERIENCE IN SELECTED INSTITUTIONS

This part of the ZBPI Survey Report provides the findings on bribery experiences in selected institutions. These are the top five institutions on the Aggregate Bribery Index, which are Zambia Police Service; Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA); Local Authorities (Councils); and, Ministries for Education (General and Higher), that is Ministry of General Education and Ministry of Higher Education. Bribery experiences in these institutions are disaggregated by the services the institutions provide.

3.7 Zambia Police Service

The public services on which data was collected in Zambia Police Service are traffic related services; criminal investigations; Interpol (motor vehicle clearance); other Police clearance services (including finger prints and firearm clearance); Police bond; Victim Support Services (e.g., GBV); and, recruitment.

3.7.1 Service Seeking Interactions

In the last 12 months, ZBPI Survey respondents are observed to have made a total of 736 service seeking visits or personal interactions with the Zambia Police Service. The most prevalent interactions were traffic related services (31.9%) and criminal investigations (30.6%), as shown in Figure 18.0 below.




Figure 18.0 Service Seeking Interactions in Zambia Police

3.7.2 Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)

The Survey findings show that of the total of 736 service seeking visits or personal interactions with the Zambia Police Service, 52.4% of the service-based interactions had a Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI). That is, in all the Service Seeking Interactions (SSI) individuals had with the institution, a bribe or an inducement of any kind was asked for or sought in 52.4% of the interactions

Bribe seeking is most experienced in traffic related services, 38.6%; criminal investigations, 23.8%; other police clearance certificate services, including finger prints and firearm clearance, 13.0%;

police bond, 11.1%; Victim Support Services (e.g., GBV), 6.5%; Interpol, motor vehicle clearance, 4.9%; and, recruitment, 2.1% (Figure 19.0).




Figure 19.0 BSI in Zambia Police Service

Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) as a percent of Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) is observed to be lowest in criminal investigations (40.9%) and Victim Support Services (41.7%); and highest in recruitment (72.7%), and traffic related services (63.4%), as shown in Table 13.0 below.

Table 13.0 BSI and SSI in Zambia Police Service

Service Sought	Service Seeking Interaction (SSI)	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	Percent BSI of SSI
Traffic related	235	149	63.4%
Criminal investigations	225	92	40.9%
Other Police clearance	92	50	54.3%
Police Bond	80	43	53.8%
Victim Support Services	60	25	41.7%
Interpol (motor vehicle clearance)	33	19	57.6%
Recruitment	11	8	72.7%
Total	736	386	52.4%

3.8 Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA)

The public services on which data was collected for the Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) are driver licensing; driving offence enforcement; examination for Certificate of Fitness; licensing of Driving School; licensing of Public Service Vehicle (PSV); registration of motor vehicle or trailer; renewal of driving licence; vehicle licensing (Road Tax); and, other (employment).

3.8.1 Service Seeking Interactions

Survey respondents are observed to have made a total of 639 service seeking visits or personal interactions with the institution in the last 12 months. The most frequent interactions were with driver licensing, 25.5%; vehicle licensing (Road Tax), 24.1%; examination for Certificate of Fitness, 20.0%⁵; and, renewal of driving licence, 17.5% (Figure 20.0).




Figure 20.0 Service Seeking Interactions in RTSA

3.8.2 Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)

Of the total of 639 service seeking visits or personal interactions with RTSA, 51.5% of the interactions resulted in a bribe seeking experience.

Bribe seeking is observed to have been experienced most when seeking a driving licensing service, 28.3%; vehicle licensing (Road Tax), 22.8%; examination for certificate of fitness, 19.8%; renewal of driving licence, 16.1%; driving offence enforcement related services, 4.3%; registration of motor vehicle or trailer, 4.2%; licensing of Public Service Vehicle (PSV), 2.7%; other (employment), 1.2%; and, licensing of driving school, 0.6% (Figure 21.0).

⁵ Generically used to include obligatory test certificate




Figure 21. BSI in RTSA

Bribe seeking as a percent of Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) is least observed in licensing of driving school (40.0%) and renewal of driving licence, (47.3%); and higher in other (employment) (66.7%) and licensing of public service vehicles (60.0%), as shown in Table 14.0 below.

Table 14.0 BSI and SSI in RTSA

Service Sought	Service Seeking Interaction (SSI)	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	Percent BSI of SSI
Driver Licensing	163	93	57.1%
Driving Offence Enforcement	28	14	50.0%
Examination for Certificate of Fitness	128	65	50.8%
Licensing of Driving School	5	2	40.0%
Licensing of PSV	15	9	60.0%
Registration of Motor Vehicle or Trailer	28	14	50.0%
Renewal of Driving Licence	112	53	47.3%
Vehicle Licensing (Road Tax)	154	75	48.7%
Other	6	4	66.7%
Total	639	329	51.5%

3.9 Local Authorities (Councils)

The public services on which data was collected in Local Authorities (Councils) are building permits services; firearm licensing; land acquisition; liquor licensing; outdoor advertising; property rates; registration of births, marriages and deaths; subdivision or consolidation permits; trading licensing and business permits; and, vendors' licensing.

3.9.1 Service Seeking Interactions

ZBPI Survey respondents made a total of 658 service seeking visits or personal interactions with Local Authorities. The most frequent interactions were with land acquisition services (25.7%) and trading licensing and business permits (22.8%), as shown in Figure 22.0 below.




Figure 22.0 Service Seeking Interactions in Local Authorities

Other services indicated are employment.

3.9.2 Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)

The percent relationship between a Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) and a Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) in Local Authorities is observed to be 43.0% of the 658 interactions. That is, a bribe demand was made in 43.0% of the interactions where a service was sought.

Bribery incidences are most observed in land acquisition, 23.7%; property rates, 20.5%; trading licensing and business permits, 18.0%; building permits, 16.2%; liquor licensing, 7.4%; registration of births, marriages and deaths, 7.1%; vendors' licensing, 3.9%; subdivision and consolidation permits, 1.4%; other (employment), 1.1%; and, firearm licensing, 0.7% (Figure 23.0)

No bribe seeking experiences are observed in outdoor advertising services.




Figure 23.0 BSI in Local Authorities

With respect to percent of a specific service provision interaction, bribe seeking is observed to be lowest in trading licensing and business permits (34.0%) and highest in firearm licensing (66.7%) and property rates services (54.2%) as shown in Table 15.0 below.

Table 15.0 BSI and SSI in Local Authorities

Service Sought	Service Seeking Interaction (SSI)	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	Percent BSI of SSI
Building Permits	91	46	50.5%
Firearm Licensing	3	2	66.7%
Land acquisition	169	67	39.6%
Liquor Licensing	43	21	48.8%
Outdoor Advertising	3	0	0.0%
Property Rates	107	58	54.2%
Registration of Births, Marriages & Deaths	48	20	41.7%
Subdivision/Consolidation Permits	10	4	40.0%
Trading Licensing & Business Permits	150	51	34.0%
Vendors Licensing	26	11	42.3%
Other (employment)	8	3	37.5%
Total	658	283	43.0%

3.10 Ministry of General Education

The public services on which data was collected in Ministry of General Education (MoGE) are registration of private education institutions; renewal of registration of private education institutions; and, services in institutions under the ministry, in particular colleges of education, secondary and primary schools, and examination certification and results.

3.10.1 Service Seeking Interactions

There were a total of 610 service seeking visits or personal interactions with the institution. With the most frequent interactions being primary school place seeking, 35.4%; examination results, 22.6%; and, secondary school place seeking, 21.5% (Figure 24.0).




Figure 24.0 Service Seeking Interactions in Ministry of General Education

Other services indicated are employment, submitting certificates for upgrading, registration of credentials and Teaching Council Licence.

3.10.2 Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)

The percent relationship between a bribe seeking incident (BSI) and service seeking interaction (SSI) in Ministry of General Education is observed to be 37.4% of the 610 the interactions.

Incidences are observed mostly in services in institutions under the Ministry. No bribe seeking experiences are observed in the ministry's public service provision of registration of private education institutions, and renewal of registration of private education institutions.

Bribe seeking is most observed in seeking primary school places (29.4%); secondary school places (26.7%); examination results (24.6%); examination certificates (8.8%); college of education places (5.7%); and other services⁶ (4.8%), as shown in Figure 25.0 below.

⁶ Employment, registration of credentials, Teaching Council Licence




Figure 25.0 BSI in Ministry of General Education

Bribe seeking as a percent of service provision interaction is observed to be lowest in primary school place and examination certificate seeking, 31.0% and 31.3% respectively; and, highest in other services (47.8%) and secondary school place seeking (46.6%), as shown in Table 16.0 below.

Table 16.0 BSI and SSI in Ministry of General Education

Service Sought	Service Seeking Interaction (SSI)	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	Percent BSI of SSI
College of Education Place	32	13	40.6%
Examination Certificate	64	20	31.3%
Examination Results	138	56	40.6%
Primary School Place	216	67	31.0%
Registration of Private Education Institution	3	0	0.0%
Renewal of Registration of Private Education Institution	3	0	0.0%
Secondary School Place	131	61	46.6%
Other	23	11	47.8%
Total	610	228	37.4%

3.11 Ministry of Higher Education

Data collected in Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) constituted Vocational and Technical College bursary; University Student Loan and Bursary; and, other services.

3.11.1 Service Seeking Interactions

There were a total of 103 service seeking visits or personal interactions with the institution. These comprised 39.8% University Student Loan and Bursary services; 35.9% Vocational and Technical College Bursary; and, 24.3% other services (indicated as applications for further studies and employment).

3.11.2 Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)

In the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), the Survey findings show that the percent relationship between a Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) and a Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) in the institution is 53.4% of 103 interactions.

Requests for a bribe or inducement of any kind are most observed in services related to Vocational and Technical College bursaries (38.2%); University Student Loan and Bursaries (32.7%); and, other services (29.1%), as shown in Figure 26.0 below.




Figure 26.0 BSI in Ministry of Higher Education

Further, bribe seeking as a percent of service provision interaction is observed to be lowest in University Student Loan and Bursary services (43.9%), and highest in other services (64.0%).

Table 17.0 BSI and SSI in Ministry of Higher Education

Service Sought	Service Seeking Interaction (SSI)	Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)	Percent BSI of SSI
University Student Loan/ Bursary	41	18	43.9%
Vocational and Technical College Bursary	37	21	56.8%
Other	25	16	64.0%
Total	103	55	53.4%

3.12 Bribe Pay Factors in Selected Institutions

The factors or reasons for paying a bribe demanded are avoiding delays; avoiding penalties or sanctions; fear of service denial; reducing costs; lack of information on how to get the service sought; and that it is a normal trend.

This section provides the findings of bribe pay factors in service-based bribery experiences with respect to avoiding delays; avoiding penalties or sanctions; fear of service denial; and other factors. The other factors are lack of information on how to get the service sought; that it is a normal trend; and, reducing costs.

3.12.1 Zambia Police Service

The bribe pay factors or reasons for paying a bribe demand in Zambia Police Service are observed to be avoiding delays, 35.2%; avoiding penalties or sanctions, 31.2%; fear of service denial, 14.4%; and other factors, 19.2% (Figure 27.0).




Figure 27.0 Bribe Pay Factors in Zambia Police Service

With respect to the service where bribe seeking is most experienced (which is traffic related services and criminal investigations), it is observed that in traffic related services bribes are paid more to avoid penalties or sanctions (41.6%); and in criminal investigations, it is chiefly to avoid delays (47.6%), as shown in Figure 28.0 below.

Figure 28.0 also shows that paying a bribe to avoid delays is prevalent in other services (48.1%).




Figure 28.0 Service-Based Bribe Pay Factors in Zambia Police Service

3.12.2 Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA)

Bribe pay factors in Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) are observed to be avoiding delays, 39.7%; avoiding penalties or sanctions, 28.1%; fear of service denial, 5.8; and other factors, 26.4% (Figure 29.0).




Figure 29.0 Bribe Pay Factors in RTSA

The services where bribe seeking is observed to have been experienced most in the institution are driving licensing, vehicle licensing (Road Tax), examination for certificate of fitness and renewal of driving licence. The Survey findings show that a bribe was paid in these services mostly to avoid delays, as shown in Figure 30.0 below.

Figure 30.0 also shows that a variance occurs in renewal of driving licence were it is observed that a bribe was paid mostly because of other factors (lack of information on how to get the service sought; that it is a normal trend; and, reducing costs) and avoiding penalties or sanctions, 40.0% and 35.0% respectively, as shown in Figure 30.0 below.




Figure 30.0 Service-Based Bribe Pay Factors in RTSA

3.12.3 Local Authorities (Councils)

In the Local Authorities (Councils) reasons for paying a bribe when seeking a service are avoiding delays, 60.2%; avoiding penalties or sanctions, 10.3%; fear of service denial, 6.4; and other factors (lack of information on how to get the service sought; that it is a normal trend; and, reducing costs) 23.1% as shown in Figure 31.0 below.




Figure 31.0 Bribe Pay Factors in Local Authorities

In Local Authorities, service-based bribery experience in terms of bribe seeking are common in land acquisition, property rates, trading licensing and business permits, building permits, and liquor licensing. In these services, the Survey findings show that a bribe was paid predominantly to avoid delays, as shown in Figure 32.0 below.




Figure 32.0 Service-Based Bribe Pay Factors in Local Authorities

3.12.4 Ministries for General Education and Higher Education

In the ministries for General Education and Higher Education bribe pay factor or reasons for paying a bribe when seeking a service are avoiding delays, 58.3%; fear of service denial, 20.0%; and other factors (lack of information on how to get the service sought; that it is a normal trend; and, reducing costs) 21.7%; and no evidence of avoiding penalties or sanctions, as shown in Figure 33.0 below.




Figure 33.0 Bribe Pay Factors in Ministries for General Education and Higher Education

PART D. GOVERNANCE, PARTICIPATION AND LEADERSHIP

This section provides the findings of the 2019 ZBPI Survey on respondents' perceptions of good governance indicators that are critical to anti-corruption and their application levels in Zambia; governance factors that are perceived to promote corruption in the country; and, anti-corruption engagement; public participation with respect to "voicing out" on corruption and reporting bribe seeking; leadership in anti-corruption

3.13 Governance and Anti-Corruption

3.13.1 Good Governance Indicators Critical to Anti-Corruption

The good governance indicators on which opinions were solicited with respect to combating corruption are:

- (a) Participation. Citizens and or individuals actively voicing their concerns and engage with government representatives.
- (b) Transparency. Ability to access information regarding any decisions taken by public officials.
- (c) Accountability. All public office decision makers being answerable to the public and institutional stakeholders.
- (d) Rule of Law. Law Enforcement Agencies and the Judiciary functioning impartially and recognising the supremacy of law and its equal application to all individuals, including public officers irrespective of their position in government.

A total of 3,661 responses are observed on which good governance indicators respondents think are critical to combating corruption, 21.2% indicate that all the good governance indicators are critical to combating corruption. With respect to each specific good governance indicator, 29.0% indicate that participation is critical to combating corruption, 24.8% accountability, 23.7 % rule of law and 22.5% transparency (Figure 34.0).




Figure 34.0 Good Governance Indicators and Anti-Corruption

With respect to perceptions of the levels of application of each specific good governance indicator, on participation, 35.2% of 839 respondents perceive it as being moderately applied; 33.2%, least applied; 16.1%, most applied; and 15.5%, not applied at all (Figure 35.0).




Figure 35.0 Levels of Application of Good Governance Indicators - Participation

While on transparency, 36.6% of 648 respondents indicated that it is least applied; 33.6%, moderately applied; 19.1%, not applied at all; and 10.7%, most applied, as shown in Figure 36.0 below.




Figure 36.0 Levels of Application of Good Governance Indicators – Transparency

For the good governance indicator of accountability, 41.6% of 714 respondents perceive the indicator as being least applied; 26.8%, moderately applied; 23.9%, not applied at all; and 7.7%, most applied, as shown in Figure 37.0 below.




Figure 37.0 Levels of Application of Good Governance Indicators – Accountability

Lastly, 31.9% of 683 respondents perceive the level of application of the good governance indicator of Rule of Law as being moderately applied; 26.7%, least applied; 23.1%, not applied at all; and 18.3%, most applied (Figure 38.0)




Figure 38.0 Levels of Application of Good Governance Indicators – Rule of Law

3.13.2 Governance Factors and Corruption

The governance factors likely promoting corruption, on which opinions were solicited are:

- Ineffective mechanisms for accountability. That is, mechanisms for government accountability remain ineffective as whistle-blowers are targeted;
- Politicisation of public sector employment (lack of meritocracy, favouritism and nepotism thereof);
- Selective or poor implementation of rules governing public sector functioning;

- (d) Because of a trend of corrupt practices, especially regarding violation of rules by individuals with political connections;
- (e) Rules and regulations related to functioning of the public sector are either selectively or poorly implemented;
- (f) Low transparency and accountability demand as the media, civil society and private sector do not have the capacity and will to raise a voice demanding transparency and accountability of government; and that,
- (g) Perpetrators of corruption are rarely caught and severely punished.

The Survey findings show that, of 1,925 respondents, 47.2% indicate politicisation of public sector employment as a governance factor that promotes corruption in Zambia; 17.4% trend of violation of rules by politically connected persons; 13.2% perpetrators of corruption are rarely caught and severely punished; 11.3% selective or poor implementation of rules governing public sector functioning; 7.1% ineffective mechanisms for accountability; and, 3.8% low transparency and accountability demand (Figure 39.0).




Figure 39.0 Governance Factors and Corruption

3.14 Knowledge and Anti-Corruption Engagement

3.14.1 Respondent Corruption Knowledge

The Survey explored respondent corruption knowledge with respect to opinions on questionnaire options of whether bribery, extortion, abuse of office, theft of public money, gifts during election period, and any other a respondent could specify, constitute acts of corruption.

From 1,092 responses, it is observed that 56.6% indicated bribery; 25.8%, abuse of office; 7.3%, gifts during election period; 7.0%, theft of public money; 1.8%, nepotism; and 1.5%, extortion (Figure 40.0).




Figure 40.0 Knowledge of Acts of Corruption

3.14.2 Anti-Corruption Engagement

The 2019 ZBPI Survey findings on respondent contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption in Zambia is observed to be 162 (8.5%) of a total of 1,897 respondents. The institution which respondents were most in contact with is observed to be the Anti-Corruption Commission (49.4%); Zambia Police Service (23.4%); Transparency International Zambia (13.0%); oversight institutions and others (11.7%); and the Drug Enforcement Commission (2.5%), as shown in Figure 41.0 below.




Figure 41.0 Respondent Contact with Anti-Corruption Institutions

The oversight institutions respondents indicated are the Judicial Complaints Commission (JCC), Office of the Auditor General (OAG), Office of the Public Protector Zambia (OPPZ) and the Police Public Complaints Commission (PPCC). While the other institutions mentioned are Labour Office, Anti-Voter Apathy, Caritas Zambia, Human Rights Commission, Ministry of General Education, and Women for Change.

The Survey findings shows that of the 162 respondents that had contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption 12.3% are in rural areas and 87.7% urban. While in terms of gender disaggregation, 44.4% are female respondents, and 55.6% male.

Further, 38.3% of the respondents that had contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption reside in high density areas; 36.4% medium density; 14.2% low density; and, 11.1% village, as shown in Figure 42.0 below.




Figure 42.0 Residence and Contact with Anti-Corruption Institutions

In addition, the Survey findings show that 26.1% of the respondents that had contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption are formally employed in the public sector; 23.0% formally employed in the private sector; 15.5% self-employed (business owner); 10.6% farmer; 9.9% unemployed; 9.3% retired; 3.7% other self-employed (trader, marketeer, fisherman or woman); and 1.9% transporter, as shown in Figure 43.0 below.




Figure 43.0 Employment Status and Contact with Anti-Corruption Institutions

The Survey findings also show that the institutions that most influenced respondents to the extent that they are able to understand what corruption is, its effects, and that they agree about what has to be done in combating corruption in Zambia (like speaking out on corruption) are the Anti-Corruption Commission (64.1%), Transparency International Zambia (11.9%), and Zambia Police Service (10.7%), as shown in Figure 44.0 below.




Figure 44.0 Most Influencing Institutions on Anti-Corruption

Other institutions indicated are Caritas Zambia; High Court; Human Rights Commission; Ministry of General Education; Women for Change; Youth Alive; RTSA; Agriculture Cooperatives; ActionAid; the Church; Ministry of Health; and, PSMD.

Further, the mode of information through which these institutions communicate the effects of corruption are predominantly television and radio programmes, 40.6% and 38.8% respectively as shown in Table 18.0 below.

Table 18.0 Anti-Corruption Information Communication Modes

Information Communication Mode	No. of Respondents	
	Absolute	Percent
Television programs	433	40.6%
Radio programs	414	38.8%
Community sensitisation meeting(s)	121	11.4%
Workshop(s)	59	5.5%
Booklets, posters, flyers	13	1.2%
Personal interaction	12	1.1%
Social media	11	1.0%
Other (print media)	3	0.3%
Grand Total	1066	100.0%

3.15 Public Participation

3.15.1 "Voicing out" on corruption

"Voicing out" on corruption, that is reacting against corruption by raising the issue within one's locality or other at a political or public service level, is indicated by 8.3% or 163 respondents of a total of 1,969 individual responses (Table 19.0).

Table 19.0 Geographic Location and "Voicing out" on Corruption

Geographic Location	No. of Responses			Percent "Voicing out"
	Total	Voiced out	Did not	
Rural	497	46	451	9.3%
Urban	1472	117	1355	7.9%
Total	1969	163	1806	8.3%

Table 19.0 also shows that "voicing out" on corruption is comparatively slightly higher within rural respondents (9.3%), than urban ones (7.9%).

In addition, the Survey findings show that 65.4% of the respondents that reacted against corruption did so because of information they received through interaction with an anti-corruption institution.

"Voicing out" on corruption with respect to gender, is both considerably low within female (6.2%), and male respondents (10.2%), as shown in Table 20.0 below.

Table 20.0 Gender and "Voicing out" on Corruption

Gender	No. of Responses		Percent "Voicing out"
	Voiced out	Did not	
Female	59	894	6.2%
Male	104	912	10.2%

Age cohort and “voicing out” on corruption is observed to be comparably high in the age groups 46 to 55 years old, 10.9%; and, over 65, 9.4% (Table 21.0). Reacting against corruption by raising the issue within one’s locality or other at a political or public service level is observed to be lowest within the age group 18 to 25 years old (7.4%).

Table 21.0 Age Cohort and “Voicing out” on Corruption

Age Cohort	No. of Responses		Percent "Voicing out"
	Voiced out	Did not	
18-25	20	250	7.4%
26-35	48	576	7.7%
36-45	44	511	7.9%
46-55	34	279	10.9%
56-65	12	141	7.8%
Over 65	5	48	9.4%

The Survey findings also show that reacting against corruption by raising the issue within one’s locality or other at a political or public service level is high among respondents with tertiary education, 13.9%; and lowest among those with primary education, 2.1% (Table 22.0).

Table 22.0 Education and “Voicing out” on Corruption

Education Level Attained	No. of Responses		Percent "Voicing out"
	Voiced out	Did not	
Not been to school	2	33	5.7%
Primary	4	189	2.1%
Secondary	65	1014	6.0%
Tertiary	92	570	13.9%

With respect to a respondent’s occupation or current employment status, “voicing out” on corruption is observed to be considerably high among the retired (16.9%) and the formally employed in the public sector (14.2%); and, low among farmers (3.9%), the unemployed (5.8%) and other self-employed (trader, marketeer, fisherman or woman) (6.1%), as shown in Table 23.0 below.

Table 23.0 Employment Status and “Voicing out” on Corruption

Employment Status	No. of Responses		Percent "Voicing out"
	Voiced out	Did not	
Farmer	10	249	3.9%
Formally employed (Private sector)	31	261	10.6%
Formally employed (Public sector)	37	223	14.2%
Other self employed	17	263	6.1%
Retired	15	74	16.9%
Self-employed (Business owner)	26	345	7.0%
Transporter	6	70	7.9%
Unemployed	14	227	5.8%

"Voicing out" on corruption or reacting against corruption by raising the issue within one's locality or other at a political or public service level with respect to a respondent's average monthly disposable income is observed to be here among those with an income of Kwacha 5,001 to 7,500 (16.5%); and low among those with an income of less than Kwacha 1,000 (7.0%), as shown in Table 24.0 below.

Table 24.0 Income and "Voicing out" on Corruption

Income	No. of Responses		Percent "Voicing out"
	Voiced out	Did not	
<= K1,000	62	824	7.0%
K1,001 - K2,500	41	417	9.0%
K2,501 - K5,000	32	324	9.0%
K5,001 - K7,500	21	106	16.5%
> K7,500	4	47	7.8%

The 8.3% or 163 respondents that are observed to have reacted against corruption, are further observed to have raised their concern on corruption mostly to the councillor within their locality (31.9%); 23.9% to their workplace supervisor or superior; 14.7% other⁷; 12.3% the District Commissioner; 9.8% Zambia Police office; and, 7.4% their Member of Parliament (Figure 45.0).

⁷ Other comprised the ACC, Anti Corruption School Club, Friends, Labour Office, the Church, Traditional Authority, Community group




Figure 45.0 Targets of "Voicing out"

Further, respondent satisfaction with the response from whom concern on corruption was raised, is observed to comprise 16.0% very satisfactory; 30.7% satisfactory; 36.8% not satisfactory; and, 16.6% had not yet received a response (Table 25.0).

Table 25.0 Responses to "Voicing out" on Corruption

Response	No. of Responses	
	Absolute	Percent
Very satisfactory	26	16.0%
Satisfactory	50	30.7%
Not satisfactory	60	36.8%
Have not received a response up to now	27	16.6%
Grand Total	163	100.0%

3.15.2 Reporting Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI)

Reporting a demand for a bribe or inducement of any kind from a public officer, the ZBPI Survey findings show is 84 respondents (4.2%) of the total number of 2,000; and, that 40.5% female and 59.5% male respondents did report a bribe seeking experience.

Reporting Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) is observed to be, predominantly respondents that are formally employed in the private sector (26.5%); self-employed business owners (25.3%); and the formally employed in the public sector (20.5%), as shown in Figure 46.0 below.




Figure 46.0 Employment Status and Reporting BSI

The institutions to which a Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) was frequently reported to, are Zambia Police Service, 48.8%; Anti-Corruption Commission, 27.4%; Police Public Complaints Commission, 3.6%; Same institution as the public officer requesting bribe, 19.0%⁸; and, Transparency International Zambia, 1.2% (Figure 47.0).




Figure 47.0 Anti-Corruption Institutions and BSI Reporting

The means of reporting a Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) are observed to be mostly in person, 89.3% of the 84 respondents that reported; seven (8.3%) respondents reported by phone; letter, one respondent (1.2%); and using a proxy, one respondent (1.2%).

⁸ Judiciary, Labour Office, Local Authority, Ministry of General Education, Ministry of Lands, Office of the Auditor General, RTSA

Further, in 51.2% Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) reporting, a response was not yet received; 33.3%, the matter was investigated and respondent informed of the outcome; 10.7%, the respondent received feedback on action to be taken; and 4.8% the problem was solved informally (that is, respondent was given back the money or gift) (Figure 48.0).




Figure 48.0 BSI Reporting Feedback

Lastly, the Survey findings show that of 1,266 responses on why a respondent did not report a Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI), 54.7% indicated that they did not report a bribe seeking incident chiefly because they are of the opinion that there is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it; 17.3%, because they do not know where to report; 13.2%, that there is no law (whistle-blower protection) that protects those that report corruption; 11.8%, that one can be arrested for reporting corruption; 1.6% because there is a mutual benefit (access to a service) in not reporting corruption; and 1.4% other (to either avoid penalties, reporting institutions are far, fear of service denial, and still considering to make a report), as shown in Figure 49.0 below.




Figure 49.0 Reason for Not Reporting BSI

Further that, of the 13.2% (167 respondents), that stated that there is no law (whistle-blower protection) that protects those that report corruption, all (100.0%) are not aware of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Whistle Blowers Act). While of the 11.8% (149 respondents) that indicated that one can be arrested for reporting corruption, 16.8% are aware of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Whistle Blowers Act).

3.16 Leadership and Anti-Corruption

3.16.1 Public Offices and Bribery

Respondent rating of the problem of corruption in public offices in the past 12 months compared to a year ago determined from 1,547 responses shows that a considerable number perceive the problem as increasing (70.6%); 28.6% that the problem has remained the same; 0.5% that it is decreasing; and, 0.2% do not know (Figure 50.0).




Figure 50.0 Rating of Corruption in Public Offices

The Survey findings also show that in 1,708 responses on whether a respondent did offer a bribe or an inducement of any kind to a public officer(s), 17.2% or 293 did do so.

Bribe offer behaviours are observed to be slightly less within female respondents (13.5%), when compared to within males (20.4%), as shown in Table 26.0 below.

Table 26.0 Gender and Bribe Offer

Gender	No. of Responses	Offered a Bribe	Percent Bribe Offer
Female	808	109	13.5%
Male	900	184	20.4%
Total	1708	293	17.2%

With respect to a respondent's occupation or current employment status, bribe offer behaviours are observed to be most prevalent within transporters (28.4%); and least within the retired (7.7%), as shown in Table 27.0 below.

Table 27.0 Employment Status and Bribe Offer

Employment Status	No. of Responses	Offered a Bribe	Percent Bribe Offer
Formally employed (Public sector)	252	44	17.5%
Formally employed (Private sector)	261	39	14.9%
Self-employed (Business owner)	341	51	15.0%
Other self employed ⁹	244	28	11.5%
Farmer	204	16	7.8%
Transporter	74	21	28.4%
Retired	78	6	7.7%
Unemployed	204	24	11.8%

The reaction from an officer to whom a bribe was offered is observed to be that 98.3% accepted the bribe; 1.4% were warned or advised not to offer a bribe to a public officer; and one case (0.3%) resulted in the respondent offering the bribe being chased from the office, as shown in Table 28.0 below.

Table 28.0 Public Officer Reaction to Bribe Offer

Reaction	Briber Offer	
	Absolute	Percent
Accepted the bribe	288	98.3%
Warned me/advised me not offer a bribe to a public officer	4	1.4%
Chased me from his/her office	1	0.3%
Grand Total	293	100.0%

3.16.2 Effort in Anti-Corruption

From 659 scaled responses on whether the government is doing enough to combat bribery and corruption at an institutional and policy level, the Survey findings show that 49.2% of the respondents disagree that government is doing enough; 26.9% strongly disagree; 23.1% neither agree nor disagree; 0.4% strongly agree; and, 0.4% agree, as shown in Figure 51.0 below.

⁹ Trader, Marketeer, Fisherman or woman




Figure 51.0 Perceptions of Effort in Anti-Corruption

Respondents that "*disagree or strongly disagree*" that the government is doing enough to combat bribery and corruption at an institutional and policy level mostly provide narratives that indicate that it is because there is more abuse of office for private gain; there are delays in Court processes; perpetrators of corruption are not arrested; there is lack of political will; there are selective arrests and prosecution of corruption suspects; and, that there is no effective action on corrupt practices.

PART E. THE DICHOTOMY OF BRIBERY

This section provides the findings of the ZBPI Survey on respondent bribery behaviours with respect to, first respondents' bribe offers and, knowledge of what constitutes corruption, contact with anti-corruption institutions, and awareness of corruption effects on service delivery. Second, respondents' bribe paying behaviours with respect to "voicing out" on corruption and reporting a demand for a bribe or inducement of any kind from a public officer.

3.17 Bribe Offer - Corruption Knowledge and Engagement

The Survey findings show that 12.1% or 110 respondents of a total of 910 respondents that indicate knowledge of what constitutes corruption offered a bribe or an inducement of any kind to a public officer(s) during their visit or interaction with a public sector institution (Table 29.0). Respondents that indicate corruption as being abuse of office are observed to comprise more of individuals that offered a bribe (14.9%).

Table 29.0 Bribe Offer and Corruption Knowledge

What Constitutes Corruption	No. of Responses	Offered a Bribe	Percent Bribe Offer
Abuse of office	248	37	14.9%
Bribery	497	59	11.9%
Extortion	10	0	0.0%
Gifts during election period	69	8	11.6%
Nepotism	20	1	5.0%
Theft of public money	66	5	7.6%
Total	910	110	12.1%

Further, the Survey findings show that of respondents that had been in contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption, 6.5% offered a bribe to a public officer(s); and, 16.1% of those that are aware of how corruption affects service delivery also offered a bribe as shown in Table 30.0 below.

Table 30.0 Bribe Offer - Corruption Engagement and Awareness

Corruption Engagement & Awareness of Corruption Effects	No. of Responses	Offered a Bribe	Percent Bribe Offer
Have had contact	153	10	6.5%
Aware of effects of corruption on service delivery	1182	190	16.1%

3.18 Bribe Paying - Corruption Engagement and Reporting

On respondents' paying the bribe sought and, respondent engagement in anti-corruption with respect to "voicing out" on corruption which is reacting against corruption by raising the issue within one's locality or other at a political or public service level, 25.1% of 163 respondents that "voiced out" are observed to have paid the bribe that was asked for by a public officer(s) during their visit or interaction with a public sector institution (Table 31.0).

Table 31.0 Bribe Paying - Corruption Engagement and Reporting

Respondent Reaction	No. of Responses	Paid Bribe Sought	Percent Bribe Pay
Voiced out	163	41	25.1%
Have reported demand for a bribe before	84	18	21.4%

Table 31.0 also shows that 21.4% of respondents that have reported a demand for a bribe or inducement of any kind from a public officer before paid the bribe that was sought.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

4.1 The Aggregate Bribery Index

The Zambia Bribe Payers Index (ZBPI) or Overall Aggregate Bribery Index measures the probability of public service seekers experiencing a bribe seeking behaviour from a public officer that results in a bribe being paid.

In 2019, the probability of paying a bribe or inducement of any kind to a public officer(s) in a public sector institution when seeking a public service is 10.9%.

No probabilities of paying a bribe sought are established in Ministry of Works and Supply, National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA), Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF) and Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL).

Lower probabilities of paying a bribe sought are in Immigration Department, 0.6%; Ministry of Finance, 0.2%; and, Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA) 0.2%.

Higher chances of paying a bribe sought when seeking a public service are in Zambia Police Service (excluding Traffic), 59.5%; Zambia Police Service (Traffic section), 40.7%; Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), 38.7%; Local Authorities, 22.9%; and, Ministries for Education, 21.1%.

The likelihood of an individual seeking a public service paying a bribe sought increased by 0.9% in 2019, when compared to the 2017 Overall Aggregate Bribery Index of 10.0.

At an institutional level the Aggregate Index (KPI Weighted Average Score) in 2019, has appreciable decreases in the likelihood of an individual seeking a public service paying a bribe in Zambia Police Service (Traffic section), 23.2%; Local Authorities (Councils), 14.1%; and, Ministries for Education, 6.4%.

Considerable increases are evidenced in Zambia Police Service (excluding Traffic section), 40.5%; and, the Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), 18.9%.

Lastly, the trend in the reporting years 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017 and 2019 of the ZBPI based on comparative sixteen (16) public sector institutions shows a consistent increase in the probability of paying a bribe demand when seeking a public service. The Overall Aggregate Bribery Index based on 16 public sector institutions was 13.6 in 2009; 9.8 in 2012; 11.9 in 2014; 13.5 in 2017; and, 15.0 in 2019.

Noteworthy is that, a point difference comparison of the Zambia Briber Payers Index (ZBPI) to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) over each Index's respective reporting years, also shows minimal differences in the trajectory of the country's corruption problem. Both the ZBPI and CPI indices show a consistent increase in the problem of corruption over the years, as shown in Table 32.0 below.

Table 32.0 ZBPI and CPI Trends

Zambia Bribe Payers Index			Corruption Perceptions Index ¹⁰		
Reporting Year	Overall Aggregate Bribery Index	Percentage Point Difference	Reporting Year	Score	Point Difference
2012	9.8	-	2015	38	-
2014	11.9	2.1	2016	38	0
2017	13.5	1.6	2017	37	1
2019	15.0	1.5	2018	35	2

4.2 Institution-Based Bribery Experience

Public service seeking interaction with the Survey target institutions is considerable high (86.3%), with the most visited or interacted with institutions being Health Services, Zambia Police Service, Local Authorities, Ministry of General Education (MoGE) and Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA).

In these institution-based interactions, bribe seeking or bribe demand was experienced in 73.9% the 23 institutions, and 28.6% individuals had a bribe seeking experience.

There were no Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) evidenced in Food Reserve Agency (FRA), Ministry of Livestock, Ministry of Works and Supply, National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA), Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF) and Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL).

Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) is experienced most in Zambia Police Service, Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), Local Authorities, and Ministry of General Education (MoGE).

Bribes actually paid constituted 68.2%. The institution to which any form of a bribe was paid to a public officer most frequently was Zambia Police Service, 42.1%; Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), 17.2%; Local Authorities (Councils), 9.2%; and, Ministry of General Education (MoGE), 6.8%.

Bribe amounts of Kwacha 101 to 250 and Kwacha 251 to 500 are established to be the most common, and two incidences of payment of a bribe in sexual favours are observed. Individuals that did not pay a bribe mostly did so because they had no money and that they do not condone bribery.

In the private sector, bribe seeking or bribe demand is considerably low (7.9%), but it is prevalent in mining, retail (excluding banking or micro financial services) and banking.

Consequences of refusing to pay a bribe that was demanded are mostly that service provision was unnecessarily delayed and that service was denied.

The salient features of the demographic dimensions of bribery experiences are that more males than females paid a bribe that was asked for by a public officer(s) during a visit or interaction with a public sector institution. Considerably more females than males felt compelled to pay the bribe to reduce costs.

¹⁰ Source: Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, Transparency International. Interpretation 0 is highly corrupt; 100 is very clean.

Lastly, bribe paying behaviours when a bribe is sought are most common among transporters, the formally employed in the public sector and, other self-employed, with such behaviours being least among those that are retired. And that, individuals felt compelled to pay the bribe that was asked for, mostly to avoid delays in service provision, and to avoid penalties or sanctions.

4.3 Service-Based Bribery Experience in Selected Institutions

Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) and paying a bribe that is asked for on one hand, and Service Seeking Interaction (SSI) on the other hand, in selected target institutions is that, in Zambia Police Service bribe seeking is lowest in criminal investigations and Victim Support Services; and, highest in recruitment and traffic related services.

While in the Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), Bribe Seeking Incident (BSI) is most experienced in other services and licensing of public service vehicles, and lower in licensing of driving schools.

In Local Authorities (Councils), bribe seeking behaviours are more prevalent in firearm licensing and property rates services, and less in trading licensing and business permits.

For the Ministry of General Education (MoGE), bribe seeking during a service provision interaction is lowest in primary school place and examination certificate seeking and, highest in other services and secondary school place seeking.

In the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) bribe seeking is low in University Student Loan and Bursary services, and comparatively higher in other services.

The reasons for paying a bribe in service-based bribery experience in the foregoing institutions are predominantly to avoid delays in getting a service, as shown in Figure 52.0 below.




Figure 52.0 Service-Based Bribe Pay Factors in Selected Institutions

With respect to actual service sought, in Zambia Police Service bribes are paid more to avoid penalties or sanctions in traffic related services and to avoid delays in the other services provided. And in Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), Local Authorities (Councils), Ministry of General Education (MoGE) and Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), paying a bribe to avoid delays is most common.

4.4 Governance, Participation and Leadership

Although it is established that there is recognition that transparency, accountability, participation and rule of law are critical good governance indicators to combating corruption, perceptions of levels of their application in the country is generally that they are either least applied or moderately applied.

Politicisation of public sector employment predominates in opinions on governance factors likely promoting corruption in the country. Other concerns are that there is a trend of violation of rules by politically connected persons, that perpetrators of corruption are rarely caught and severely punished, and that there is selective or poor implementation of rules governing public sector functioning.

In 2019, respondent corruption knowledge on what constitutes corruption shows a considerable shift in opinion when compared to 2017. Although, the predominance of bribery as one act that constitutes corruption has remained, its emphasis has declined by 17.2 percentage points (Figure 53.0). Opinions on abuse of office as one act that constitutes corruption have moved from 10.0% in 2017 to 26.3% in 2019, indicating a 16.3 percentage point increase (Figure 53.0).




Figure 53.0 Opinion on Acts of Corruption 2017 and 2019

Individual participation in anti-corruption through contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption in Zambia is very low. Only 8.5% of 1,897 have had anti-corruption

contact with individuals from the Anti-Corruption Commission, Zambia Police Service, and Transparency International Zambia. In addition, contact with persons from institutions engaged in combating corruption is predominantly with individuals that are formally employed in the public and private sectors.

Participation and anti-corruption leadership in terms of “*voicing out*” on corruption, that is reacting against corruption by raising the issue within one’s locality or other at a political or public service level, is considerably low (8.3%). Retirees and formally employed individuals in the public and private sector “*voice out*” most, while farmers and the unemployed do so the least.

Individuals anti-corruption leadership with respect to reporting a demand for a bribe or inducement of any kind made by a public officer(s) is also very low (4.2%). Reporting bribe seeking is predominantly by individuals that are formally employed in the private sector, self-employed business owners and the formally employed in the public sector.

Reasons for not reporting bribe seeking incidences are mostly that there is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it; no knowledge of where to report; lack of a law that protects (whistle-blower protection) those that report corruption; and, that one can be arrested for reporting corruption. In addition, respondents that stated that there is no law (whistle-blower protection) that protects those that report corruption are all not aware of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Whistle Blowers Act).

Further, rating of the problem of corruption in public offices in 2019 when compared to 2017 shows considerably changes in perception on whether the problem is increasing or decreasing. In 2019, perceptions that the problem is increasing, increased by 11.0 percentage points when compared to 2017, moving from 59.6% to 70.6% as shown in Figure 54.0 below. Perceptions that the problem of corruption in public offices is decreasing, decreased by 10.2 percentage points in 2019 (Figure 54.0).




Figure 54.0 Rating of Corruption in Public Offices 2017 and 2019

In addition, the problem of corruption as established in the 2019 ZBPI Survey when compared to the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) – Africa 2019 shows minimal variations, as shown in Figure 55.0 below. The dominant perception in both is that corruption is increasing or has increased in the past 12 months.




Figure 55.0 Corruption Problem Comparison 2019 ZBPI and GCB – Africa 2019

Public officer(s) leadership in anti-corruption with respect to refusing a bribe when it is offered is very poor. In the 17.2% incidences where a bribe or an inducement of any kind was offered to a public officer(s), 98.3% of the officers accepted the bribe.

Lastly, perceptions of government effort in anti-corruption, that is whether it is doing enough to combat bribery and corruption at an institutional and policy level, is considerably that it is not the case. And that this is because there still is more abuse of office for private gain, delays in Court processes, perpetrators of corruption are not arrested, lack of political will, selective arrests and prosecution of corruption suspects and, that there is no effective action on corrupt practices.

4.5 The Dichotomy of Bribery

The dominant “two faces” or dichotomy of bribery incidences the 2019 ZBPI Survey evidences are, first, that knowledge of what constitutes corruption can likely be associated with one’s bribe offering behaviours, as only 12.1% of 910 that know what constitutes corruption offered a bribe or an inducement of any kind to a public officer(s) during their visit or interaction with a public sector institution. And, that contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption can also likely influence bribe offering behaviours, as only 6.5% of 153 individuals that had been in contact offered a bribe.

Second, “voicing out” on corruption does not seem to considerably be associated with bribe paying when a demand is made, as 25.1% of 163 that “voiced out” are evidenced to have paid the bribe that was asked for by a public officer(s) during their visit or interaction with a public sector institution; and a considerable number that report bribery incidences also do actually pay the bribe sought.

5.0 EMERGING ISSUES

The trajectory of the probability of public service seekers experiencing a bribe seeking behaviour from a public officer is consistently showing no significant improvement in general. Institutions where the probability is high are the same.

However, it is now clear that there are points of service delivery that need specific interventions in Zambia Police, Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), Local Authorities, Ministry of General Education (MoGE), and Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE).

The emerging issue, attendant thereof, is the need for development of service-specific anti-corruption interventions. For Zambia Police Service, the points of public service delivery needing attention are traffic related services, Interpol (motor vehicle clearance), other Police clearance and Police bond services; Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA), it is licensing of Public Service Vehicles (PSV) and Driver licensing; Local Authorities (Councils), property rates and building permits services; Ministry of General Education (MoGE), examination results services, and college and secondary school place seeking; and Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), Vocational and Technical College Bursary services.

Further, bribe offering and paying behaviours among transporters have always been evidently high in consequent ZBPI Survey Reports. This clearly also necessitates specific anti-corruption interventions in this sector.

Lastly, another critical emerging issue from the 2019 ZBPI Survey is that individual participation in anti-corruption through contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption in Zambia needs redress, and more so given the evidence that such contact is predominantly with individuals that are formally employed in the public and private sectors.

In addition, there is need for interventions to scale up “voicing out” on corruption within one’s locality or other at a political or public service level, and indeed, having a critical mass of citizen anti-corruption leadership in terms of corruption reporting when a demand for a bribe or inducement of any kind is made by a public officer(s).

Appendix I. Briefs on TI-Z and ACC

Transparency International Zambia (TI-Z)

Transparency International Zambia (TI-Z) is a local chapter of the global civil society movement Transparency International (TI), which is dedicated to the fight against corruption and the promotion of transparency, integrity, accountability and generally good governance in the discharge of public functions. TI-Z has a Vision statement of having A Zambia anchored on citizens and institutions of integrity and Mission statement being a leading anti-corruption crusader contributing to Zambia's development based on a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability through the promotion of good governance and zero tolerance to corruption.

Our main goal is to contribute to the reduction of corruption through promotion of good governance in Zambia by upholding the following general organizational objectives:

- (a) To effectively and efficiently play the role of a watchdog institution against corruption and to be catalytic in the promotion of integrity and good governance in Zambia;
- (b) To promote constructive debate and dialogue among various actors on the situation of corruption, good governance and integrity in Zambia;
- (c) To develop sustainable coalitions for the purposes of joint action and enhance information sharing among various stakeholders; and
- (d) To develop the organizational and human capacities of various actors to effectively deal with issues of corruption, good governance and integrity.

TI-Z is currently working to promote transparency, accountability, integrity, democracy, rule of law and human rights. The notion is that once these areas are improved, the prevalence of corruption would reduce. TI-Z is working to influence change at two levels, namely systemic change at institutional and policy levels and attitudinal and behavioural change at personal level focusing on people. The envisaged outcomes of this will be better Institutional processes and structures, policy adoption and amendments, i.e. policy, legal and institutional reforms as well as improvements in implementation and enforcement of policies laws and administrative requirements.

TI-Z is also working to foster attitudinal and behavioural change among people to conform to values of good governance. The idea is to empower people to; be aware of and claim their rights, hold their leaders accountable and act in ethical ways. The envisaged changes out of this will be more community action in demanding transparency, accountability and integrity from duty bearers (leaders and service providers), more activism, petitions and other calls for change, more reporting of grievances and seeking redress against injustice.

Anti-Corruption Commission

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is established by the Anti-Corruption ACT No. 3 of 2012. The Corrupt Practices ACT first established the ACC initially¹¹. The Corrupt Practices ACT was enacted on 24th September 1980, to stiffen penalties for corruption offences, which were hitherto quite weak under the Penal Code¹². Subsequently, the Corrupt Practices ACT, was repealed and replaced by the Anti-Corruption Commission ACT number 42 Of 1996.

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is the main body tasked to combat corruption in Zambia. The mandate of the ACC is to prevent and take necessary and effective measures for the prevention of corruption in public and private bodies; to receive and investigate complaints of alleged or suspected corrupt practices, and subject to the directions of the Director of Public Prosecutions, to prosecute those suspected of involvement in corruption; to investigate any conduct of any public and private officer which in the opinion of the Commission may be connected with or conducive to corrupt practices; and to do such things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the functions.

The Commission also disseminates information on the evil and dangerous effects of corrupt practices on society; and enlisting and fostering public support against corrupt practices.

11 ACT No. 14 of 1980

12 Chapter 87 of the laws of Zambia

Appendix II. District Sample Sizes

No.	District	Sample Size
1	Chadiza	33
2	Chinsali	58
3	Chipata	161
4	Chongwe	67
5	Kabwe	74
6	Kalomo	83
7	Kaoma	68
8	Kasama	92
9	Kasempa	22
10	Livingstone	59
11	Lusaka	659
12	Luwingu	43
13	Mansa	85
14	Masaiti	22
15	Mkushi	51
16	Mongu	68
17	Mpika	77
18	Ndola	159
19	Samfya	32
20	Solwezi	87
	Total	2000

Appendix III. ODK Collect Household Survey Questions¹³

2019 Zambia Bribe Payers Index

Household Respondent Survey Questionnaire

Thank you for kindly accepting to spare some of your time for this interview. The Zambia Bribe Payers Index Survey is being carried out by Transparency International Zambia and the Anti-Corruption Commission. The purpose of the Survey is to establish the extent of bribery in the delivery of public services in Zambia. The findings will be used to inform key policy strategies and approaches that can be adopted by Government and other stakeholders in order to reduce incidences of bribery in the various institutions, and in so doing improve public service delivery.

We would like to assure you that your responses will be treated with the utmost confidentiality and will be used only for the intended purpose. We therefore would like to ask you to be open and free. And we will not take more than 30 minutes of your time.

1. Questionnaire No:
2. Research Assistant: First Name
3. Research Assistant: Last Name
4. Date and Time of Interview:

PART 1. Locational Information

5. Select Province

| Central | Copperbelt | Eastern | Luapula | Lusaka | Muchinga | Northern | North – Western | Southern | Western |

6. Select District

| Kabwe | Mkushi | Masaiti | Ndola | Chadiza | Chipata | Mansa | Samfya | Chongwe | Lusaka | Chinsali | Mpika | Kasama | Luwingu | Kasempa | Solwezi | Kalomo | Livingstone | Kaoma | Mongu |

7. Enter Ward:

PART 2: RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS

- 8 Sex of respondent

| Male | Female |

- 9 Age of respondent (as at last birthday)

| Below 18 (Not applied) | 18-25 | 26-35 | 36-45 | 46-55 | 56-65 | 66-75 | More than 75 |

- 10 Marital status

| Single | Married | Separated | Divorced | Widowed |

- 11 Area of Residence

| High density | Medium density | Low density | Village |

- 12 Highest level of education attained

¹³ The questions herein listed do not include the questions for ACC and TI-Z programs monitoring

| Not been to school | Primary (Pre-school to Grade 7) | Basic (Grade 8 and 9) | High school (Grade 10 – 12) | Tertiary |

13 What is your occupation/current employment status? (Encircle one option that best describes a respondent's main economic activity)

| Formally employed/ public sector government | Formally employed/ private sector | Self-employed Business owner | Trader | Farmer | Fisherman or woman | Marketeer | Transporter | Truck bus car bicycle | Retired | Unemployed |

14 Average monthly disposable income (income after taxes)

| Less than K 250 | K 251 - K 500 | K 501 - K 1,000 | K 1,001 - K 2,500 | K 2,501 - K 5,000 | K 5,001 - K 7,500 | Over K 7,500 |

15 Do you have any disabilities?

| YES | NO |

PART 3. BRIBERY INCIDENCE, PREVALENCE, FREQUENCY & BRIBE SIZE

16 In the last 12 months, which public sector institution did you visit or interact with (personally) to seek a public service? IF RESPONDENT DID NOT VISIT THE INSTITUTIONS 1 TO 6, SKIP TO QUESTION 23.

| Zambia Police Service | Local Authorities (Councils) | Ministry of General Education | Ministry of Higher Education | Road Transport & Safety Agency (RTSA) | Zambia Revenue Authority | Hospitals/Health Services (MoH) | Judiciary (courts) | National Registration Office | Ministry of Lands (Land issues ONLY) | Passport Office | Ministry of Agriculture | Ministry of Livestock | Zambia Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO) | Immigration Department | Food Reserve Agency (FRA) | Ministry of Works and Supply | Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF) | Ministry of Finance | National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA) | Road Development Agency (RDA) | Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA) | Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL) | Ndola City Council (For Ndola ONLY) |

17 If the institution you visited or interacted with is Zambia Police Service, what was the nature/type of service you sought?

| Criminal Investigation | Firearm Clearance | Interpol/ Motor Vehicle Clearance | Police Bond | Traffic Related | Victim Support Services (e.g., GBV) | Other Police Clearance Certificate (e.g., Fingerprints) | Other (Specify) |

18 If the institution you visited or interacted with is a Local Authority (Council), what was the nature/type of service you sought?

| Building Permit | Firearm Licensing | Land acquisition | Liquor licensing | Outdoor advertising | Property Rates | Registration of Births, Marriages & Deaths | Subdivision/Consolidation Permit | Trading Licensing & Business Permits | Vendors Licensing | Other (Specify) |

19 If the institution you visited or interacted with is Ministry of General Education, what was the nature/type of service you sought?

| College of Education Place | Examination Certificate | Examination Results | Primary School Place | Registration of Private Education Institution | Renewal of Registration of Private Education Institution | Secondary School Place | Other (Specify) |

20 If the institution you visited or interacted with is Ministry of Higher Education, what was the nature/type of service you sought?

| Vocational and Technical College Bursary | University Student Loan/ Bursary | Other (Specify) |

21 If the institution you visited or interacted with is Road Transport & Safety Agency (RTSA), what was the nature/type of service you sought?

| Driver Licensing | Driving Offence Enforcement | Examination for Certificate of Fitness | Licensing of Driving School | Licensing of Public Service Vehicle | Registration of Motor Vehicle or Trailer | Renewal of Driving Licence | Vehicle Licensing (Road Tax) | Other (Specify) |

22 If the institution you visited or interacted with is Zambia Revenue Authority, what was the nature/type of service you sought?

| Customs | Tax |

23 How many times did you visit or interact with the public sector institutions you have mentioned?

| 1-3 times | 4-7 times | Over 7 times |

24 During your visit or interaction did you offer a bribe or an inducement of any kind to a public officer(s) (civil servant)?

| YES | NO |

25 Were you asked for a bribe or an inducement of any kind by a public officer(s) during your visit or interaction?

| YES | NO |

26 In which ONE public sector institution did public officer(s) or staff demand or ask for bribes most frequently? (Only ONE response allowed) PLEASE DO NOT READ OUT THE OPTIONS PROVIDED

| Zambia Police Service | Local Authorities (Councils) | Ministry of General Education | Ministry of Higher Education | RTSA | Hospitals/Health Services (MoH) | Judiciary (courts) | National Registration Office | Ministry of Lands (Land issues ONLY) | Passport Office | Zambia Revenue Authority | Ministry of Agriculture | Ministry of Livestock | ZESCO | Immigration Department | Ministry of Works and Supply | Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF) | Ministry of Finance | NAPSA | RDA | PACRA | ZAMTEL |

27 How many times in the past 12 months were you asked for a bribe by a public officer(s) during your visit or interaction?

| 1-3 times | 4-7 times | Over 7 times |

28 Did you pay the bribe that was asked for by a public officer(s) during your visit or interaction?

| YES | NO |

29 Why did you not pay the bribe that was asked for by a public officer(s) during your visit or interaction?

| Had no money | I do not condone bribery | Other (Specify) |

30 How many times in the past 12 months did you pay a bribe in any form to a public officer(s) during your visit or interaction?

| 1-3 times | 4-7 times | Over 7 times |

31 In the past 12 months, to which public sector institution, did you pay a bribe in any form to a public officer(s) most frequently? (Only ONE response allowed) PLEASE DO NOT READ OUT THE OPTIONS PROVIDED

| Zambia Police Service | Local Authorities (Councils) | Ministry of General Education | Ministry of Higher Education | RTSA | Hospitals/Health Services (MoH) | Judiciary (courts) | National Registration Office | Ministry of Lands (Land issues ONLY) | Passport Office | Zambia Revenue Authority | Ministry of Agriculture |

Ministry of Livestock | ZESCO | Immigration Department | Ministry of Works and Supply | Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF) | Ministry of Finance | NAPSA | RDA | PACRA | ZAMTEL |

32 Approximately, how much was the largest bribe that you paid in the past 12 months to a public officer(s)?

| Less than K50 | K50-K100 | K101-K 250 | K251-K500 | K501-K1,000 | K1001-K2000 | Over K2000 | In kind Agricultural commodities | In kind Business commodities | In kind Sexual favours | Other (Specify) |

33 From which institutions did a public officer(s) demand the largest bribe in the past 12 months? PLEASE DO NOT READ OUT THE OPTIONS PROVIDED

| Zambia Police Service | Local Authorities (Councils) | Ministry of General Education | Ministry of Higher Education | RTSA | Hospitals/Health Services (MoH) | Judiciary (courts) | National Registration Office | Ministry of Lands (Land issues ONLY) | Passport Office | Zambia Revenue Authority | Ministry of Agriculture | Ministry of Livestock | ZESCO | Immigration Department | Ministry of Works and Supply | Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF) | Ministry of Finance | NAPSA | RDA | PACRA | ZAMTEL |

34 In the last 12 months, which private sector institution did you visit or interact with (personally)? PLEASE DO NOT READ OUT THE OPTIONS PROVIDED. Respondents can, however, be guided.

| Banking | Construction | Manufacturing | Micro Financial Services | Mining | Private Education | Retail (other than banking or micro financial services) | Other Sector (Specify) |

35 How many times did you visit or interact with the private sector institutions you have mentioned?

| 1-3 times | 4-7 times | Over 7 times |

36 During your visit or interaction did you offer a bribe or an inducement of any kind to a member of staff or members of staff?

| YES | NO |

37 Were you asked for a bribe or an inducement of any kind by a member of staff or members of staff in the sector, during your visit or interaction?

| YES | NO |

38 In which ONE private sector institution did a member of staff or members of staff demand or ask for bribes most frequently? (Only ONE response allowed) PLEASE DO NOT READ OUT THE OPTIONS PROVIDED

| Banking | Construction | Manufacturing | Micro Financial Services | Mining | Private Education | Retail (other than banking or micro financial services) | Other Sector (Specify) |

39 How many times in the past 12 months were you asked for a bribe by a member of staff or members of staff in the sector during your visit or interaction?

| 1-3 times | 4-7 times | Over 7 times |

40 Did you pay the bribe that was asked for by a member of staff or members of staff during your visit or interaction?

| YES | NO |

41 How many times in the past 12 months did you pay a bribe in any form to a member of staff or members of staff during your visit or interaction?

| 1-3 times | 4-7 times | Over 7 times |

42 In the past 12 months, to which private sector institution, did you pay a bribe in any form to a member of staff or members of staff most frequently? (Only ONE response allowed) PLEASE DO NOT READ OUT THE OPTIONS PROVIDED

| Banking | Construction | Manufacturing | Micro Financial Services | Mining | Private Education | Retail (other than banking or micro financial services) | Other Sector (Specify) |

43 Approximately, how much was the largest bribe that you paid in the past 12 months to a member of staff or members of staff in the sector?

| Less than K50 | K50-K100 | K101-K 250 | K251-K500 | K501-K1000 | K1001-K2000 | Over K2000 | In kind Agricultural commodities | In kind Business commodities | In kind Sexual favours | Other (Specify) |

44 From which sector did a member of staff or members of staff demand the largest bribe in the past 12 months? PLEASE DO NOT READ OUT THE OPTIONS PROVIDED

| Banking | Construction | Manufacturing | Micro Financial Services | Mining | Private Education | Retail (other than banking or micro financial services) | Other Sector (Specify) |

PART 4. IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF BRIBE REFUSAL (SEVERITY)

45 If you were asked for a bribe or inducement of any kind, did you get the service after failing or refusing to pay the bribe that was demanded by a public officer or an individual in the private sector?

| YES | NO |

46 What was the reaction or consequence after you refused to pay the bribe?

| Service was denied | Service was unnecessarily delayed | Service was given promptly | Service was given extraordinarily faster | Other (Specify) |

47 If you paid the bribe that was demanded by a public officer or an individual in the private sector, did you feel compelled to pay in order to get a service even though you did not want to?

| YES | NO |

48 What factors led to you to paying a bribe?

| To avoid delays | To avoid penalties/sanctions | Fear of service denial | To reduce costs | Lack of information | It is a normal trend | Other (Specify) |

PART 5. GOVERNANCE, LEADERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION

49 Which of the following good governance indicators do you think are critical to combating corruption?

| Citizens actively voice their concerns and engage with government representatives (Participation) | Citizens are able to access information regarding any decisions taken by public officials (Transparency) | All public office decision makers are answerable to the public and institutional stakeholders (Accountability) | Law Enforcement Agencies and the Judiciary functions impartially and recognises the supremacy of law and its equal application to all individuals, including public officers irrespective of their position in government (Rule of Law) | All the above |

50 What would you say is the level of application of the following good governance indicators in combating corruption in Zambia?

(a) Participation

| Most applied | Moderately applied | Least applied | Not applied at all |

51 Transparency

| Most applied | Moderately applied | Least applied | Not applied at all |

52 Accountability

| Most applied | Moderately applied | Least applied | Not applied at all |

53 Rule of Laws

| Most applied | Moderately applied | Least applied | Not applied at all |

54 Which of the following governance factors would you say promote corruption in Zambia?

| Mechanisms for government accountability remain ineffective as whistleblowers are targeted | Public sector employment is political and not based on merit, and there is a lot of favouritism and nepotism | A trend of corrupt practices, especially regarding violation of rules by individuals with political connections | Rules and regulations related to functioning of the public sector are either selectively or poorly implemented | The media, civil society and private sector do not have the capacity and will to raise a voice demanding transparency and accountability of government | Perpetrators of corruption are rarely caught and severely punished | Other (Specify) |

55 What in your opinion and knowledge constitutes corruption?

| Bribery | Extortion | Abuse of office | Theft of public money | Gifts during election period | Other (Specify) |

56 Have you been in contact with persons or officials from institutions engaged in combating corruption in Zambia?

| YES | NO |

57 Which institution, were they from? (Multiple responses allowed)

| Anti-Corruption Commission | Transparency International Zambia | Police Public Complaints Commission | Zambia Police Service | Drug Enforcement Commission | Office of the Auditor General | Public Protectors Office | Judicial Complaints Authority | Other (Specify) |

58 Are you aware of how corruption affects both Public and Private sector service delivery?

| YES | NO |

59 Which of these institutions influenced you the most, to the extent that you are now able to understand what corruption is, its effects, and agrees about what has to be done in combating corruption in Zambia, like speaking out on corruption? (Only ONE response allowed)

| Anti-Corruption Commission | Transparency International Zambia | Police Public Complaints Commission | Zambia Police Service | Judicial Complaints Authority | Other (Specify) |

60 Through which mode of information did these institutions communicate the effects of corruption?

| Radio programs | Television programs | Community sensitisation meetings | Workshop(s) | Other (Specify) |

61 Have you ever reacted against corruption by raising the issue within your locality or other at a political or public service level?

| YES | NO |

62 To whom did you raise your concern on corruption?

| Member of parliament | Councillor | District Commissioner | Other (Specify) |

63 How satisfactory was their response?

| Very satisfactory | Satisfactory | Not satisfactory | Have not received a response up to now |

64 Was your reaction against corruption, because of information you received through interaction with an anti-corruption institution?

| YES | NO |

65 How do you rate the problem of corruption in public offices in the past 12 months compared to a year ago?

| Increasing | Remained the same | Decreasing | Don't know |

66 Is the government doing enough to combat bribery and corruption at an institutional and policy level?

| Strongly agrees that it is doing enough | Agrees | Neither agrees nor disagrees | Disagrees | Disagrees strongly |

67 If you "disagree or strongly disagree" that the government is doing enough to combat bribery and corruption at an institutional and policy level, please give TWO reasons why you think so.

72 Have you ever reported a demand for a bribe or inducement of any kind from a public officer?

| YES | NO |

73 Which institution did you report to? (Only ONE response allowed)

| Anti-Corruption Commission | Transparency International Zambia | Police Public Complaints Commission | Zambia Police Service | Same institution as the public officer requesting bribe (Please specify) | Other institution (Specify) |

74 How did you report the bribery incident?

| Letter | Phone | Email | Other online mode (That is, an institutions Website feedback option, Facebook, etc) | In person | Other (Specify) |

75 What happened after your reporting?

| Received feedback on action to be taken (case referred to another institution, your matter will be investigated or your matter will not be investigated) | The matter was investigated and I was informed of the outcome | Problem was solved informally and I was given back the money/gift | Have not received a response up to now | Other (Specify) |

76 Which of the following statements can best represent your opinion on why you did not report the incidence of bribery? (Do not read out the responses. Listen for a response that approximates the statement. If NONE enter OTHER and seek an explanation) (Only ONE response allowed)

| There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it | One can be arrested for reporting corruption | There is no law that protects those that report corruption | I do not know where to report corruption | Other |

77 Are you aware of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Whistle Blowers Act)?

| YES | NO |

78 If you did offer a bribe, the last time you offered a bribe or inducement of any kind to a public officer, what was the reaction from the officer?

| Warned me/ advised me not offer a bribe to a public officer | Reported me to his/her supervisor | Reported me to a law enforcement agency | Chased me from his/her office | Accepted the bribe | Other (Specify) |

Appendix IV. ZBPI Survey Target Public Sector Institutions

- (1) Food Reserve Agency (FRA)
- (2) Health Services (MoH)
- (3) Immigration Department
- (4) Judiciary (Courts)
- (5) Local Authorities (Councils)
- (6) Ministry of Agriculture
- (7) Ministry of Finance
- (8) Ministry of General Education
- (9) Ministry of Higher Education
- (10) Ministry of Lands (Land issues only)
- (11) Ministry of Livestock
- (12) Ministry of Works and Supply
- (13) National Pension Scheme Authority (NAPSA)
- (14) National Registration Office
- (15) Passport Office
- (16) Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA)
- (17) Public Service Pensions Fund (PSPF)
- (18) Road Development Agency (RDA)
- (19) Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA)
- (20) Zambia Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO)
- (21) Zambia Police Service
- (22) Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA)
- (23) Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL)